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I. BACKGROUND

A. The Antitrust Laws
1. Origins and Theory
Of singular import in this country's rise to international
prominence has been a phenomenal rate of economic growth accompanied by an unparalleled utilization of material resources.
Many factors have converged to occasion our present condition
of affiuence.1 In fact, the historical influences have been so
varied and diverse as to render impossible any attempt to identify a single sufficient cause explicatory of our economic success.
Efficient causes, on the other hand, are discernible.2 And, of
these, none has proven more significant in our unique experience
than the operation of the principle of competition in open markets.3
Very early in American history, the application of the laissez
faire doctrine in a predominantly rural society led to the acceptance of competition as the economic and social basis of an individual-centered society. In fact, laissez faire became, through the
"Protestant Ethic," a code of positive morality.4 The successful
man was the moral man. To be poor was to be immoral, even
sinful.
Self-assertion, of course, meant competition, for others sought
the same and similar objectives. Economic success, that is, the
outselling of one's competitors, required efficient production, low
prices, and high quality products. Through competition, the great
teaching of classical economics was realized, that "by serving
ourselves, we serve all." 5
In classical theory, government had little role to play in the
operation of the economic mechanism. Indeed, a kind of natural
law, anthropomorphized by early economists in the form of an
"unseen hand," was regarded as entirely sufficient for regulatory
1, See generally Galbraith, The Affluent Society (1960).
2. The terms are employed in their ordinary social science meaning.
3. "The heart of national economic policy has long been faith in the
value of competition," Standard Oil v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248
(1951).
4. See Maurer, Great Enterprise 25-39 (1955).
5, Cf. Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees (1714),
1
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purposes. 6 The theory of passive government, although acceptable in an agrarian society, proved incompatible with the rise of
industry. Unrestrained competition led to single-firm domination; and with accelerating advances in transportation and communication, the control of supply approach nationwide dimensions.
With no one left with whom to compete, business efficiency was
no longer imperative, prices soared, and quality deteriorated.
The mandate for government action was clear. In order to
preserve competition from its own self-destructive characteristics, 7 legislation was necessary to "maintain" or "regulate"
competition as the basis of economic life. 8 Thus, through the
adoption of the antitrust laws, government, previously passive,
assumed a positive role in achieving the economic objectives
of society.
2. Statutes and Their Enforcement 9
The basic statute of our federal antitrust complex is the
Sherman Act lO of 1890. Described as a "charter of economic
freedom,"11 the Act declares every "contract, combination and
conspiracy . . . in restraint or' interstate and foreign commerce
to be illegal as a misdemeanor,12 and further provides that
every person who shall "monopolize or attempt to monopolize"
or combine or "conspire" with others to monopolize such interstate or foreign trade will be guilty of a misdemeanor. 13 In
addition to the authority to impose fines and/or order imprisonment, the courts are invested with injunctive powers to prevent
continued violation. The Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice administers the Act.
6. See Soule, Ideas of the Great Economists 30-52 (1952). See generally Smith, The Wealth of Nations (1776).
7. See Generally Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy: Origination
of an American Tradition (1955); and Wilcox, Public Policies Toward
Business (1955).
8. Cf. Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Laws 18-19 (2d ed. 1959), where
the terms "maintained" and "regulated" competition are employed.
9. No attempt is made to present an exhaustive treatment of the
federal antitrust laws. For an anlysis that is both detailed and constructive, see the Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. (1955),
10. 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 u.s.c. §§ 1-8 (1890).
11. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359, 53
S. Ct. 471, 479 (1933).
12. § 1.
13. § 2.
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In 1914 two other statutes were added to the antitrust arsenal.14 These were the Federal Trade Commission Actl5 and
the Clayton Act.16 Though the former is not exclusively an antitrust statute, section 5 has that effect in declaring unlawful "unfair methods of competition" in interstate commerce. Under the
section, the Federal Trade Commission is directed to combat
both "full blown and incipient menaces to competition." 17 Its
orders to "cease and desist from using such method[s] of competition or such act(s] or practice[s]" are buttressed by fines
recoverable by the government in civil actions in the federal
courts.
The antitrust provisions of the Clayton Act are sections 3,
7, and 8. Section 3 is concerned with exclusive arrangements
and tying clauses. Section 7 covers acquisitions by a corporation
of the whole or any part of the stock or assets of another corporation. Section 8 deals with interlocking directorates. Whenever any of the above activities by persons or businesses "may
be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly," the Federal Trade Commission is charged with the authority to enforce compliance with the Act by restoring competitive
conditions.18 The Department of Justice may also assume jurisdiction under the Act when the public interest requires and is
under duty to do so where criminal violations occur.19 The jurisdiction of the two enforcing agencies over Clayton Act violations
is thus concurrent. 20
In addition to "cease and desist orders" and the possibility
of a divestiture order breaking up an illegal merger (governmental remedies), enforcement of antitrust objectives is furthered by provision for treble damage and injunction actions by parties
injured by the proscribed activities.
The objectives of the three core statutes described above,
as well as the role that their enforcement has played in the
14. The three statutes are not the only federal antitrust laws.
Mention should also be made of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat.
1526, 15 u.s.c. §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a (1936); the Miller-Tydings
Act, 50 Stat. 693, 15 U. s. C. § 1 (1955); and the McGuire Act,
66 Stat. 632, 15 u.s.c. § 45 (1958).
15. 38 Stat. 717, as amended, 15 u.s.c. §§ 41-51 (1938).
16. 38 Stat. 730, as amended, 15 u. s. c. § § 12-27, 29 u. s. C. § 52
(1914).
17. Oppenheim, supra note 8, at 18.
18. See generally Elkouri, Trade Regulation 14 (1957).
19. See generally Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 374-77 (1955).
20. See Kintner, An Antitrust Primer 25-26 (1965).
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phenomenal successes of this country in the current century, were
well stated in the Report of the Attorney General's Committee:
The general objective of the antitrust laws is promotion of competition in open markets. This policy is a primary feature of private enterprise. Most Americans have long recognized that opportunity for
market access and fostering of market rivalry are basic tenets of our
faith in competition as a form of economic organization.

Antitrust is a distinctive American means for assuring the competitive economy on which our political and social freedom under representative government in part depend. These laws have helped release energies essential to our leadership in industrial productivity and technological development. They reinforce our ideal of careers open to superior skills and talent, a crucial index of a free society. As a result,
the essentials of antitrust are today proclaimed by both political parties
as necessary to assure economic opportunity and some limitation on
economic power incompatible with the maintenance of competitive conditions. 21

Over the years antitrust enforcement has undergone periods
of extreme ebb and flow. The electrical equipment cases22 illustrate the results of the vigorous enforcement policies of each of
the two previous Assistant Attorneys General for Antitrust. 23
Present Justice Department activity, however, appears to be approaching an all-time low, despite public activist pronouncements
of the present Assistant Attorney General to the contrary. 24 In
contrast to similar inactivity at ·the Federal Trade Commission,
private enforcement activities in the way of treble damage actions
are on the increase. 25 The rationale of active enforcement is the
same by whatever agency it is brought: "competition is the counterpart and corollary of economic freedom, and . . . a free economy is necessarily a competitive economy." 26
21. Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 1-2 (1955).
22. £!.. Goldstein, "The Tariff Is the Mother of Trusts," 39 Texas L.
Rev. 711 nn. 4 & 5 (1961); Loevinger, "The New Frontier in Antitrust." 39 Texas L. Rev. 865, 866 (1961).
23. See Loevinger. ibid., and Orrick. "Antitrust in the Great Society."
27 A.B.A. Antitrust Section 26 (1965).
24. Compare "Symposium," 30 A.B.A. Antitrust Section 100 (1966). with
Wall St. J. • Vol. CLXIX, No. 2.9, p. 1. col. 6, Feb. 10, 1967. See,
however, remarks of newly appointed Attorney General Clark, New
York Times, p. 18C, col. 5, March 3, 1967.
25. See Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 62 s. Ct. 972 (1942), to the
effect that a state is a "person" within the meaning of the Clayton
Act provision for the recovery of treble damages.
26. Loevinger, supra note 22.
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3. The Role of the States
Though attention to antitrust in this century has been focused
principally upon its federal aspect, the states as well, in varying
degrees, have assumed functions in this regard. In fact state
legislative activity predates its federal counterpart, as Kansas,
Texas, Tennessee, and Michigan all adopted antitrust laws in
1889, one year before the Sherman Act emerged from Congress. 27
The concern of state legislatures with providing local procedures for the promotion of competition did not terminate with
the various federal enactments. It is clear that the Sherman,
Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts have not preempted
state action.28 The result is that at this date over four-fifths of
the states have general antitrust laws providing for enforcement
against restraints of trade and monopolization.29 Indeed, in some
states prohibitions against restraint of trade and monopolization
are included in their constitutions.30
Variation in language, particularly in the coverage and exemption provisions,31 require attention to specific statutes when
a particular problem in a particular jurisdiction is at issue. 32
Nevertheless, sufficient similarity is evinced-both in statutory
terminology and in judicial interpretation (which ordinarily follows

27. See Summary of Remarks of Mr. Wilson, First Natienal Conference
on Consumer and Investor Protection 2 (1960). published by the
Council of State Governments (hereafter cited as First National
Conference).
28. "[I]n the antitrust field, we have never had a doctrine of federal
preemption. Antitrust has always been an area of federal-state
concurrent jurisdiction." Summary of Remarks of Mr. Loevinger,
Second National Conference on Consumer and Investor Protection
4 (1961), published by the Council of State Governments (hereafter
cited as Second National Conference).
29. Rahl, "Toward a Worthwhile State Antitrust Policy," 39 Texas L.
Rev. 753 (1961). 4 Trade Reg. Rep. ,r 30,000 et seq. collects all
the state laws. Alaska, Delaware, Maryland, ~ a . Oregon,
Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island have no general antitrust laws at
this time; Georgia has a statute with no sanctions, and the New
Jersey law applies only to mergers. 30. Twenty-two states have constitutional provisions prohibiting
restraints of trade and monopolization. See Sieker• "The Role of
the States in Antitrust Law Enforcement-Some Views and Observations," 39 Texas L. Rev. 873, 878 (1961).
31. E.g. • some states included "services" within the antitrust
provisions.
32. See generally 4 Trade Reg. Rep. ,r 30, 000 et seq.
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that developed in regard to the federal laws)- 33 to justify certain
general observations. Thus, the typical antitrust statute is modeled more or less on the Sherman Act, with or without the more
specific requirements of the Clayton Act alluded to above.34 Whatever the statutory terminology, however, the objective seems uniformly the same-to guarantee the operation of competition in
open markets. Illustrative is the Alabama statute which provides,
inter alia, as follows:
Any person or corporation who engages or agrees with other persons
or corporations, or enters into, directly or indirectly, any combination,
pool, trust, or confederation, to regulate or fix the price of any article
or commodity to be sold or produced within this state, or any person or
corporation, who enters into, becomes a member of, or party to, any
pool agreement, combination, or confederation, to fix or limit the quantity of any article or commodity to be produced, manufactured, mined
or sold, in this state, must, on conviction, be fined not less than five
hundred, nor more than two thousand dollars.
Any person or corporation, domestic or foreign, which shall restrain or attempt to restrain the freedom of trade or production, or
which shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize the production, control,
or sale or any commodity, or the prosecution, management, or control
of any kind, class, or description of business; or which shall destroy
or attempt to destroy, competition in the manufacture or sale of a
commodity, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction, shall
be fined not less than five hundred nor more than two thousand dollars
for each offense. 35

The statute is phrased in terms of criminal offense. As
was indicated with regard to the federal laws, however, civil
remedies likewise exist in the states to assist in enforcing antitrust laws. Thus, many states provide for private damage suits36

33, E.g., People v. Building Maintenance Contractors' Ass'n, 41 Cal.
2d 719, 264 P,2d 31 (1953); State v, Detroit Asphalt Paving Co.,
244 Mich. 119, 221 N. W. 122 (1928) (applying the "Rule of Reason").
34. The various categories of state laws are collected in Elkouri,
supra note 18, at 16-18.
35. Tit. 57, §§ 106 & 108 (1960).
36. Approximately three-fifths of the states so provide. See Robinson,
Tabulated Results of Answers to Questionnaire on State Antitrust
Activity in 1957 (mimeo. ).
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and some even allow forfeiture of corporate charters for violation. 37
Ordinarily, but not universally, enforcement is confined to
the state attorney general's office 38 or to damage suits by private parties. Few states have any procedures for administrative enforcement such as exists nationally under the jurisdiction
of the Federal Trade Commission. 39
On the other hand, the law in books does not necessarily
coincide with the law in practice. Antitrust statutes are not
self-executing. Staffs, money, and a desire to enforce statutorily-guaranteed competition are rquired.40 And, in this regard,
state activity has been noticeably deficient. As summarized by
one observer:
Among the states having general antitrust laws, only four have shown
any degree of continuing enforcement activity over a substantial period of
recent years. These are Missouri, New York, Texas and Wisconsin.
Except for occasional appearance in private litigation, the laws in most
of the remaining states have been comatose for many years. The Middle
West, often regarded as the incubator of antitrust philosophy, has some
of the most moribund states. There are no reported cases of state enforcement in the annotations in Illinois since 1905, in Minnesota since
1914, in South Dakota since 1915, in Ohio since 1922, in Kansas since
1923, in Indiana since 1926, in Nebraska since 1929, or in Michigan
since 1933. There is no report of any case in Iowa or North Dakota.
Of the thirty-five states reporting in the survey conducted by the New
York State Bar Association Committee in 1956, only five reported any
state cases since before World War n. 41

Of late, however, the tempo of state antitrust activity has
undergone a marked increase. Previously inactive states such
as California, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, and Washington have
recently entered the arena of enforcement, and Texas and Wisconsin have quickened the pace of their already active antitrust
endeavors. 42 Both the Antitrust Division of the Department of
37. E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 44-1402 (1949).
38. Local district attorneys may also be invested with enforcement
jurisdiction. See chart: "State Antitrust Enforcement Officers, "
pp. 37-38.
39. Some states, however, do possess such agencies. See, e.g. ,
Wisconsin experience, reported in Appendix E.
40. See generally Rahl, supra note 29, at 763-66.
41. Id. at 753-54.
-42. See replies to Questionnaire, Appendix E.
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Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have stressed, in this
regard, the importance of increased state activity as a necessary
complement to federal policy .43 Some of the reasons are as
follows:
First, there are important areas where state antitrust enforcement may
be the only available remedy because of the purely intrastate nature of
the practice or the failure of Congress to extend a particular facet of
federal antitrust to the full constitutional limit. In other areas where
jurisdiction is concurrent, the states may well be better equipped to treat
restraints which, though affecting or in interstate commerce, are primarily of local impact: the Department of Justice necessarily must give
priority in assigning its limited manpower to practices affecting multistate markets. And in situations where the Department does bring an
action, adequate local relief can sometimes be secured only by state authorities acting under their own laws to correct local aspects of a more
widespread combination.
Vigorous state antitrust law enforcement thus appears necessary to
insure the protection of the local market places of the states. At the
same time, it is a valuable complement to the federal antitrust program,
with benefits to the national competitive climate that are felt beyond state
borders.44

In addition, efforts are being made to coordinate federal and
state enforcement procedures. 45 In this manner, the states may
learn from federal experience, wasteful duplication is avoided,
and, most important, through joint efforts a sound, overall antitrust policy may be forged, assuring the nation a sound and durable economy. 46
B. The Investigative Aspect
The significance of adequate investigatory and discovery procedures to the effective enforcement of the antitrust laws-state
or federal-is impossible to overstate. The acquisition of facts
is, without question, the very basis of the enforcement process.
43. See Remarks of Mr. Dixon and Mr. Loevinger, Second National
Conference, supra note 28, at 3-6.
44. Stern, "A Proposed Uniform State Antitrust Law: Text and Commentary on a Draft Statute," 39 Texas L. Rev. 717-18 (1961).
45. See Remarks of Attorney General Kennedy, Second National
Conference, supra note 28, at 1-2.
46. Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 2 (1955). See also Remarks
of Mr. Wilson, Second National Conference, ~ note 28, at 1.
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As stated by the Attorney General's Committee:
The inevitable generality of most statutory antitrust prohibitions renders facts of paramount importance. Accordingly, effective enforcement
requires full and comprehensive investigation before formal proceedings,
civil or criminal, are commenced. Incomplete investigation may mean
proceedings not justified by more careful search and study, Public retreat by the prosecutor may then be difficult, if not impossible, and the
result may be a futile trial exhausting the resources of the litigants and
increasing court congestion. Thus the adequacy of investigatory processes
can make or break any enforcement program. 47

The quotation, though concerned with the federal laws, is
equally applicable to state antitrust laws. Hence, pretrial investigatory procedures available in the enforcement of state
antitrust objectives warrant particularized study.

47, Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm, Antitrust Rep. 343-44 (1955).

II. THE FEDERAL MODEL
A. Dual Enforcement
By way of introduction to the various state procedures, a
brief description of their more familiar federal counterpart is
valuable both in providing a focus for inquiry and in affording
a basis for comparative evaluation. In addition, recent developments at the federal level appear instructive as to the direction
that the stat.es might take in creating or reconstituting their
respective discovery practices more adequately to accomplish
such antitrust objectives as they may wish to pursue.
As noted above, 48 federal enforcement is not confined to a
single governmental body. Rather, the task is bifurcated between an independent regulatory agency (the Federal Trade Commission) and a department of the executive branch (the Antitrust
Division of Justice}. The resulting duality of authority, as might
be expected, has necessitated a great deal of cooperation in investigating possible violations of the laws. 49 The "goal of 'efficient cooperation' through dual enforcement" was specifically
endorsed by the Attorney General's Committee. 50
B. Federal Trade Commission Investigations
The Federal Trade Commision possesses extensive investigatory powers. Illustratively, section 6(a} of the Federal Trade
Commission Act accords the power:
To gather and compile information concerning, and to investigate
from time to time the organization, business, conduct, practices, and
management of any corporation engaged in commerce, excepting banks
and common carriers subject to the Act to regulate commerce, and its
relation to other corporations and to individuals, associations, and partnerships. 51
48. See notes 9-20 supra and accompanying text.
49. See Remarks of Mr. Dixon, Second National Conference, ~
note 28, at 8.
50. Supra note 27, at 875. See also Chadwell, "Antitrust Administra-

tion and Enforcement," 53 Mich. L. Rev. 1133 (1955).
51. Elkouri, Trade Regulation 32 (1957).

10

THE FEDERAL MODEL

11

In effect, the section (in conjunction with sections 6(b)-(h) )
endows the Commission with investigatory and information-gathering powers practically coextensive with the power of Congress
to regulate interstate commerce. And, the power to investigate
is well fortified with an impressive array of factfinding machinery. Access to records as well as extensive subpoena
powers-both of persons and of records-are provided. According to section 9, the Commission:
, shall at all reasonable times have access to, for the purpose of
examination, and the right to copy any documentary evidence of any corporation being investigated or proceeded against; and the commission shall
have power to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of all such documentary evidence relating to
any matter under investigation, Any member of the commission may
administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, and receive evidence, 52
As the statutory language discloses, the scope of the administrative subpoena power is very broad. No requirement of
probable cause exists to limit judicial enforcement of the subpoena, 53 and the defenses of irrelevancy 54 and unreasonableness 55
have been all but destroyed by judicial decision. The practical
effect is that "fishing expenditions" into private papers-once so
universally abhorred by American jurisprudence56 -have become,
with the maturity of the administrative process, acceptable practice. The investigatory power of the Commission may, indeed,
be likened to that of a grand jury:
Because judicial power is reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until
it is shown to be relevant to issues in litigation, it does not follow that
an administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are enforced
52. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.31-1.42 (1960).
53 • .£!.. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U,S. 632, 70 s. Ct.
357 (1950).
54. See Civil Aeronautics Board v. Herman, 353 U.S. 322, 77 s. Ct.
804 (1957).
55, See generally Schwartz, "A Decade of Administrative Law," 51
Mich, L, Rev. 775, 784-89 (1953),
56. "lt is contrary to the first principles of justice to allow a search
through all the respondent's records relevant or irrelevant in the
hope that something will turn up. " Federal Trade Commission v.
American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306, 44 s. Ct. 336, 337
(1924),
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may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry. It has a power
of inquisition, if one chooses to call it that, which is not derived from
the judicial function. It is more analogous to the Grand Jury, which does
not depend on a case or controversy for power to get evidence but can
investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even
just because it wants assurance that it is not. 57

C. Justice Department Investigations
1. Criminal Cases

Where a criminal indictment is contemplated, the Justice
Department possesses, through invocation of a grand jury, equally embracive investigatory powers. Thus:
[ T]he federal grand jury is equipped with ample powers to permit the
fullest investigation. The grand jury subpoena may be used to compel
the discovery of all documentary material reasonably required as well
as the testimony of witnesses under oath. 58

In addition, preliminary inquiries may be made either by
personnel of the Antitrust Division or by the FBI. Should the
preliminary inquiry reveal information warranting more intensive
scrutiny, the Department of Justice ordinarily orders a full-scale
investigation by the FBI. 59 And, of course, if indictment is issued, the discovery mechanism of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure (Rule 17(c)) becomes available.60
2. Civil Cases
Civil investigation, on the other hand, was, until 1962, insufficient to satisfy enforcement requirements. In such investigation, the Department of Justice had three alternatives. 61 These
were to:
57. United States v. Morton Salt Co., supra note 53, at 642-43, 70
S. Ct. 357, at 364.
-58. Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 344 (1955).
59. See generally Van Cise, Understanding the Antitrust Laws 128-30
(1955).
60. See generally "Developments in the Law-Discovery," 74 Harv. L.
Rev. 940, 1053 (1961).
61. An additional possibility, which, however, has never been utilized,

is that by statute the Justice Department might request that the
Federal Trade Commission conduct investigations for it. The use
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(a) depend upon voluntary cooperation of those under investigation;
(b) file a civil complaint and make use of the discovery processes
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; or
(c) make use of the grand jury. 62
Owing to the inadequacies of the first two possibilities and
the essential unfairness of the third,63 Congress passed, in
September of 1962, the long-awaited Civil Investigative Demand
Bill.64 In essence, the Bill (reprinted as Appendix A) provides
a precomplaint investigatory process for use where civil proceedings are originally contemplated and voluntary cooperation
by those under investigation fails. The result is that the Department of Justice may now require the production of an unprivileged correspondence or business records of any party
under investigation without having first to file a civil complaint
or utilize the criminally-oriented grand jury procedure. 65
Upon deciding to proceed with civil suit, the full battery of
discovery processes under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(interrogatories, motions to produce documents, depositions, etc.)
becomes available.66 (See Appendix B.) Such methods, also
accessible to private parties in treble damage and injunction
actions, "have been extensively used in antitrust cases and provide discovery powers almost as sweeping as a grand jury." 67
Thus, the fact-acquiring machinery available to the Department of Justice now approximates that available to the Federal
Trade Commission. The provision for precomplaint investigation has afforded a necessary complement to postcomplaint (pretrial) discovery in the enforcement, on the civil side, of antitrust objectives.
(Footnote continued)
of this technique is limited because the authorization applies only to
corporations, there is some question whether the Commission is
under obligation to make the investigation requested, and the staff
of the Commission investigators is already overburdened, See
"Antitrust Civil Process Act," H,R. Rep. No. 1386, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess., 4 (1962).
62. Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 344 (1955).
63. Id., at 344-45.
64. For an analysis, see Perry & Simon, "The Civil Investigative
Demand: New Fact-Finding Powers for the Antitrust Division,"
58 Mich. L. Rev. 855 (1960).
65. Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 344-45 (1955).
66. Id. at 344 n. 1.
67. Id. at 344.

III. STATE PRETRIAL PROCEDURES
A. In General
Investigation and discovery in state antitrust enforcement
have characteristics similar to those described with respect to
federal practice. Thus, the distinction between precomplaint
investigation and postcomplaint {but pretrial) discovery is evident
at this level as well. All states provide, as incidents of their
general adjective law, for some sort of discovery or factfinding
machinery subsequent to the filing of a civil complaint or the
issuance of a criminal indictment or information. Justice is
thought to be best served by minimizing surprise and so-called
lawyers' tricks in the trial of cases.68 Such, of course, applies
as well to antitrust as to any other form of litigation; and once
suit is commenced, the usual discovery procedures of the state
come into operation to the same extent and with the same effect
as in any other criminal or civil case.
Precomplaint investigation, on the other hand, is not generally available under state procedure laws-at least on the civil
side. Though in criminal investigations, the grand jury (as at
the federal level) possesses extensive compulsory process powers,
discovery in civil antitrust cases-in the absence of a special
statute according subpoena or visitorial powers to the attorney
general or some other state official-must await the filing of a
complaint. Of course, voluntary cooperation of suspected violators might be solicited. But in the absence of such a special
statute as mentioned above, no compulsory process is available.
Analysis of such precomplaint visitorial laws as now exist, together with the arguments pro and con their employment, is
presented later.

68. "Mutual lmowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties
is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may
compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. 11
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507, 67 s. Ct. 385, 392 (1947).
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B. State Discovery Practice
1. Criminal Cases

Assuming a state antitrust law with penal sanctions {fine
and/ or imprisonment) 69 and a desire and ability (staff and
money) 70 to effect enforcement, the question arises as to what
factfinding apparatus is invocable to ferret out possible violations. In addition to whatever investigatory powers might be
possessed by the attorneys general by virtue of a special statute, the ordinary criminal procedures of the state may be utilized. The general criminal discovery provisions of the states
(with references to the appropriate sections of the statutes)
are summarized below.
CRIMINAL DISCOVERY APPARATUS

STATE
Alabama

CODE NO.
§§15:99-118
§30:83

Alaska

Arizona

§§66-7-1 to
66-7-16
§§66-8-21

§§13-1441 to
13-1454

Arkansas

§43-911
§43-801
§43-606

California

PEN §1326

SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS
Procedure for issuance of search
warrants
Grand· jury power of subpoena
Magistrate issues search warrant
Implicit recognition of grand jury
power of subpoena
Search warrant by magistrate

Grand jury subpoena power
Prosecuting attorney subpoena power
Magistrate subpoena power
Attendance of witnesses compelled
by magistrate, district attorney
or grand jury

69. Re those states currently imposing such criminal penalties, see
Robinson, supra note 36, at 2.
70. One possibility for financing such investigations would be to earmark
a percentage of the fines or civil damages for antitrust purposes.
Texas currently employs such a device. See remarks of Mr.
Wilson, First National Conference, supra note 27, at 8.
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Criminal Discovery Apparatus (cont.)
Colorado

§39-2-6
§ 39-6-7

Court power to issue search warrant
Subpoena power of court

Connecticut

§54-2a

Circuit court to issue subpoena and
warrants of capias
Warrant to be issued for witnesses
threatening to leave jurisdiction

§

54-23

Delaware

T.11 §2303
T.11 § 2304
T.11 § 2305
T.11 § 5101

Search w/o warrant
Provisions for search warrant
Objects of search warrant
Superior court to issue subpoenas

Florida

T.45 §§901.02to
901.21
T.45 §902.07
T.45§902.16

Provisions for arrest and search
warrants
Magistrate to summon witnesses
Grand ju_ry subpoena power implicit
from duty to inquire

Georgia

§§ 27-301 to
27-304
§ 27-404
§ 27-413

Search warrants

§§255-16 &
255-17
§§ 222-1 to
222-6

Judge or other magistrate to order
search warrant
Subpoena of witnesses

Hawaii

Idaho

§ 19-807
§ 19-1101

Compelling attendance of witnesses
Grand jury subpoena power

Magistrate issues subpoena for
witnesses
Grand jury subpoena implicit in duty
to inquire

Illinois

Ch. 38 § 683
Ch. 38 § 714

Compulsory attendance of witnesses
Pretrial hearings of prosecution
witnesses

Indiana

§ 9-819 to
§ 9-823

Grand jury power to issue subpoena

Iowa

T.31 §751.3 to
§ 751.12

Magistrate and grand jury to have
subpoena power; provisions

Kansas

§ 62-301

County attorney and attorney general
power to issue subpoena to witnes ses
Magistrate subpoena power

§§62-602 &
62-627
§§ 62-916 to
62-920

Grand jury subpoena power

STATE PRETRIAL PROCEDURES
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Criminal Discovery Apparatus (cont.)
Kentucky

T .IV §62
T. VI §105

Magistrate subpoena power
Grand jury subpoena power

Louisiana

Ch.1 §15:41
Ch.1 §15:209

Judge power to issue search warrant s
Grand jury subpoena power implied
from duty to inquire
Grand jury power to order production
of evidence

Ch.1 §15:214

Maine

Ch.146 §20
Ch.148 §18

Judge may order appearance of
witnesses
After indictment, judge may order
appearance of material witnesses

Maryland

Rule 114

Subpoena power of magistrate

Massachusetts

Ch. 277 §5

Grand jury power to inquire into
facts of alleged crime
Court to bind material witnesses by
recognizance

Ch. 276 §45
Michigan

§28. 943
§ 28. 945
§28.929

Grand jury subpoena power
Penalty for noncompliance with
subpoena
Magistrate subpoena power

Minnesota

§ 629. 54

Recognizance by court of all materi al
witnesses

Mississippi

T.10 Ch. 11,
§§ 1886 - 1891

Grand jury subpoena power

Missouri

T.37 §§544.420
& 544.440
T.37 §§540.160,
540.170, &
540.440

Recognizance of material witnesses
Grand jury subpoena power over
witnesses except those to be
called by defense

Montana

§94-6106
§94-6120
§94-6316

Magistrate order for witnesses
Securance of witnesses
Grand jury duty to inquire into
alleged criminal acts

Nebraska

§29-502

Recognizance and securance of
witnesses
Grand jury power to compel attendance of witnesses

§ 29-1409
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Criminal Discovery Apparatus (cont,)
Nevada

§171,400
171.485

Magistrate subpoena power
Security for appearance of witnesses

§595:1

Justice or magistrate to issue
search warrant
Provision for search and seizure
w/o warrant
Grand jury duty to inquire into
alleged criminal acts

§

New Hampshire

§ 595:6
§600:3

New Jersey

§2A:81-15
§2A:73-3

Sanctions for noncompliance with
subpoena
Grand jury duty to inquire into
possible criminal actions

New Mexico

§41-3-7
§41-3-10

Magistrate subpoena power
Grand jury power to call all witnesses deemed necessary

New York

T,4 §245

Grand jury duty to inquire into
criminal acts
Grand jury power to order production of evidence

T,4 §250

North Carolina

Ch,8 §8-59

Clerk to issue subpoena of behalf
of either party

North Dakota

§29-07-10
§§29-09-08 &
29-10-18

Magistrate to issue subpoena for
witnesses
Grand jury duty to inquire into
criminal acts

Ohio

§2935.22
§2939,12

Magistrate to issue subpoena
Grand jury subpoena power

Oklahoma

Ch,3 T,22,
§§271 - 275
Ch,8 T,22,
§311

Securance and attendance of witnesses
Grand jury duty to inquire into
alleged criminal actions

Oregon

§139,020

Magistrate subpoena power at preliminary hearing
District attorney to issue subpoena
for grand jury witnesses
District attorney to issue subpoena
for witnesses at trial
Production of books, documents, etc,

§

139.030

§139,040
§139,080
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Criminal Discovery Apparatus (cont.)
Pennsylvania

T.19 Ch.9,
§ 631

Compulsory testimony of nondefendant witnesses in nonincriminatory
matters

Rhode Island

§12-13-12

Binding witnesses to appear at trial

South Carolina

§517-309

Penalty for noncompliance with orde r
to appear as witness

South Dakota

§34.1103

Search warrant to issue for articles
used or to be used in commission
of public offense
Subpoena duces tecum
Compulsory testimony, immunity to
attach in such matters
Grand jury power and duty to inquire into criminal actions

§34.2402
§34.2403
§34.1215
Tennessee

§

40-502

§

40-1618

Search warrant for articles used
or to be used in commission of
public offense
Grand jury subpoena power

Texas

T. 7 Ch.4,
Arts. 461-466
T.7 Ch.2,
Art. 382

General subpoena power in all
magistrates
Grand jury subpoena power

Utah

§ 77-19-1

Grand jury power and duty to inquire into criminal actions
Grand jury subpoena power
Grand jury power to compel production of documents
Magistrate subpoena power at preliminary hearings
Subpoena duces tecum

§ 77-19-4
§ 77-19-8
§ 77-15-8
§

77-45-2

Vermont

§ 6603

Virginia

§

19.1-106

§19.1-155
§

19.1-263

Sanctions for noncompliance with
summons as a witness
Recognizance of witnesses by magistrates
Grand jury power and duty to inquire into alleged criminal actions
Commonwealth's attorney to issue
subpoena for witnesses
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Criminal Discovery Apparatus (cont.)
Washington

§ 10.16. 010
§ 10. 28. 090
§ 10. 52. 040

West Virginia

§

6159

§6236

Judge of Superior Court to issue
summons for witness
Grand jury power to inquire into
criminal actions
Compelling attendance of witnesses
Recognizance of witnesses in specified cases
Prosecuting attorney power of subpoena

Wisconsin

§ 325. 01

Provisions for securance of witnesse s

Wyoming

§ 7-105
§ 7-148

Grand jury subpoena power
Search warrant to issue for items
used in the commission of a public
offense

2. Civil Cases
In the absence of voluntary cooperation or a compulsory process statute, investigation of possible violations of civil antitrust
provisions is confined to suits in progress, that is, it must await
the filing of a civil complaint. Assuming such suit has been instituted in the state courts, the ordinary discovery procedures of
the state become activated. Current state civil discovery practice-available both to the government and to private parties in
injunction or damage actions-7lis summarized as follows.

71. Re those states currently providing for civil damages, see Robinson,
supra note 36, at 1.
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CIVIL DISCOVERY APPARATUS

STATE

CODE NO.

Alabama

T. 7
T.7
T. 7
T, 7

Ch. 10
Ch,10
Ch.10
Ch.10

Alaska

§58-1-2

§§447-456
§§457-474
§§477-486
§§ 487-490

SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS
Subpoena of witnesses
Despositions of witnesses
Interrogatories
Production of books and
records

§§ 58-4-11 to 58-4-13
§§ 58-4-21 to 58-4-27

Right of inspection of public
record
Subpoena power of witnesse s
and records
Despositions within state
Despositions outside state

Arizona

§12-2212
RCP, Rules 26-37
RCP, Rule 45

Subpoena duces tecum, powe r
Discovery and despositions*
Subpoena of witnesses*

Arkansas

§§28-305,28-306,28-318, Deposition and discovery
28-323,28-332,28-333,
procedure
28-346 to 28-361
!I !I 28-801 to 28-807
Order for production of
books and documents

California

Pt4 T3 §!11985-1993

§58-3-2

Pt4 T3 §§2019-2023
Pt4 T3 !12024
Pt4 T3 §§2064-2066

Subpoena duces tecum and
means of production
Depositions
Interrogatories
Subpoena of witnesses; rights
and duties

Colorado

RCP, Rules 26-37
RCP, Rule 45

Depositions and discovery*
Subpoena of witnesses*

Connecticut

§ 52-148, §52-153
§52-143
§52-197

Depositions
Subpoena of witnesses
Motion for disclosure of
facts, books, records, etc
Disclosure by corporate
officer

§52-198

*Provisions are identical with those of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
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Civil Discovery Apparatus (cont.)
Delaware

T.10 §4301

Chancery Rules 26-37
Chancery Rule 45
Superior Rules 26-37
Superior Rule 45
Florida

Vol. 30 Rule 1. 27
Vol. 30 Rule 1. 28
Vol. 30 Rule 1. 30

Vol. 30 Rule 1. 34

Liability for noncompliance
with subpoena
Discovery and depositions*
Subpoena of witnesses*
Discovery and depositions*
Subpoena of witnesses*
Interrogatories to parties
Order for production of
documents
Demand for admission of
fact & genuineness of
documents
Subpoena of witnesses

Georgia

§ 38-801 to §38-1001
§38-1101 to §38-1201
§81-1012

Order for production of pape rs
Discovery procedure
Request for admission of fac t
& genuineness of document s

Hawaii

§222-1
§225-1

Subpoena of witness
Inspection and discovery

Idaho

§§ 9-701 to 9-707

Subpoena of witnesses and
books, records, etc.
Depositions and interrogator·1es
Securance of attendance of
witnesses

§§ 9-901 to 9-929
§§ 9-1301 & 9-1302

Illinois

Ch. 110 §§ 101.16 to
101.20

Indiana

Iowa

Discovery procedures: depositions, inspection, etc.

§§ 2-1028, 2-1060, &
2-1061
§§ 2-1644 & 2-1645
§§ 2-1501 to 2-1509,
& 2-1533 to 2-1536

Interrogatories

T.31 §622.63
T. 31 §622-65
T. 31 §622. 79

Subpoena of witnesses
Subpoena duces tecum
Sanctions for failure to obey
subpoena.

Production of books, etc.
Depositions

*Provisions are identical with those of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
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Civil Discovery Apparatus (cont.)
Kansas

§60-2803
§§60-2806 & 60-2807
§60-2833

Compelling party to testify
Subpoena duces tecum
Depositions on oral interrogatories

Kentucky

Bald, Rules 26-37
Bald. Rule 45

Discovery and depositions*
Subpoena of witnesses*

Louisiana

Bk.2 T,3
Arts. 1421 to 1515

Comprehensive modes of
discovery, production of
documents, subpoenas, e tc.

Maine

Ch.113 §112
Ch.117 §§1 to 32

Subpoena of witnesses
Depositions, interrogatorie s,
production of documents,
et.c.

Maryland

Rule 405

Depositions on oral interrogatories
Summons for documentary
evidence
Inspection of records, et.c.
Sanctions for noncompliance
with discovery orders

Rule 407
Rule 419
Rule 422

Massachusetts

Ch,231 §61
Ch.231 §65
Ch.231 §69
Ch. 233 §l
Ch. 233 §§24 to 43

Michigan

§§27-38 to 27.42

Interrogatories
Interrogatories to corporation
Inspection and admission of
records and documents
Subpoena of witnesses
Depositions

§§ 27. 922 to 27. 923

Discovery procedure in
general
Subpoena of witnesses

Minnesota

RCP Rules 26 to 37
RCP Rule 45

Discovery and depositions*
Subpoena of witnesses*

Mississippi

§1658
§§1699 to 1701
§1659

Subpoena duces tecum
Depositions
Production of books, et.c.

*Provisions are identical with those of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
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Civil Discove~y Apparatus (cont.)
Missouri

§492.300
§492.490
§ 510. 020
§510.030

Depositions
Subpoena of material witne sses
Interrogatories
Order for production of
books, records, documents, etc.

Montana

§93-8301

Demand for inspection of
books
Subpoena duces tecum
Modes of discovery in
general

§93-1501 to 93-1503
11§93-1601-1 to
93-1601-5
Nebraska

1125-1223, §25-1224
1125-1225, §25-1267
§25-1267. 39

Subpoena duces tecum
Depositions
Production of documents fo r
inspection and copying

Nevada

NRCP, Rules 26-37
NRCP, Rule 45

Discovery and depositions*
Subpoena of witnesses*

New Hampshire

§§

516:1 - 516:7

§§

517:1 - 517:11

New Jersey

§2A:81-ll
§§2A:81-15, 2A:81-16
§2A:82-23

New Mexico

New York

RCP, § 21-1-1
Rules 26-37
Rule 45

CPA §§288-308
CPA §§322-328

Subpoena, attendance and
duties of witnesses
Depositions and interrogatories
Compelling testimony of
adverse party
Subpoena of material witnesses
Order for production of
original documents
Discovery and depositions*
Subpoena of witnesses*
Depositions and interrogatories
Admission, discovery, and
inspection of books, records, etc.

*Provisions are identical with those of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
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Civil Discovery Apparatus (cont,)
North Carolina

§§1-568,1 to
1-568.16
§ 1-568.17
§ 8-61
§ 8-71 to § 8-84
§ 8-89 to §8-91

Pretrial hearing and discl0sure of evidence
Written interrogatories
Subpoena duces tecum
Depositions
Production and admission
of writings

North Dakota

NDRCP Rules 26-37
NDRCP Rule 45

Discovery and depositions*
Subpoena of witnesses*

Ohio

§§ 2319. 01 to
2319,38
§§2317.11 to
2317.15
§§2317.31 to
2317.35

Depositions and interrogatories
Subpoena and appearance of
witnesses
Production, admission and
inspection of documents

Oklahoma

T .12 §§386 - 387
T .12 §§433 - 436
T.12 §§481 - 482

Subpoena duces tecum
Depositions
Admission and inspection of
documents, writings, etc

Oregon

§ 41. 615

Court order for inspection
of documents
Admission of facts and genuineness of documents
Subpoena duces tecum
Depositions

§41. 620
§§44, 110, 44.120
§45. 030
Pennsylvania

T.28 §351
T.28 §§4 - 9
T.28 §61

Rhode Island

§§9-17-1 to 9-17-16
§§9-18-1 to 9-18-15
§9-19-23

Subpoena of material witnesses
Depositions
Courts to compel production
of documents
Securance of witnesses
Depositions
Provisions for production
of documents

*Provisions are identical with those of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
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Civil Discovery Apparatus (cont.)
South Carolina

§§26-201 to
26-206
§26-502
§§26-701 to
26-709

Compelling attendance of
witnesses
Production of books, etc.
Depositions

South Dakota

§

36. 0202
§§36.0301 to
36.0532

Depositions
Subpoena of witnesses and
sanctions for noncompliance
Procuring evidence: discovery, admissions,
inspections, etc.

§§ 36. 0601 to
36.0606

Tennessee

§21-1009
§ 21-1010
§24-902
§24-916
§24-201

Texas

TRCP Rule 167

TRCP Rule 169
TRCP
TRCP
TRCP
TRCP
TRCP

Rule 176
Rule 186
Rule 188
Rule 189
Rule 199

Interrogatories to parties
Sanctions for failure to
answer interrogatories
Circumstances authorizing
the taking of deposition s
Depositions on oral interrogatories
Subpoena duces tecum
Production of documents
and things for inspection,
copying, or photographi ng
Admission of fact and genuineness of documents
Subpoena of witnesses
Depositions of witnesses
Deposition of adverse par ty
Written interrogatories
Oral depositions

Utah

§78~24-4 &
§78-24-6
RCP Rules 26-37
RCP Rules 45

Attendance and duties of
witnesses
Discovery and depositions *
Subpoena of witnesses*

Vermont

T.12 §§1231 to 1251

Depositions and interrogatories
Subpoena of witnesses and
attachment to secure at
tendance

T.12 §§1621 to 1624

*Provisions are identifical with those of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
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Civil Discovery Apparatus (cont.)
Vermont (con't.}

T.12 §1641
T.12 §1691

Virginia

§8-296
§8-304
§ 8-320
§ 8-324 & § 8-325

Washington

West Virginia

Rules of Court:
Rules 26-37
Rules 45
§§ 5734 - 5739
§ 5741
§5743
§5744

Wisconsin

Compelling attendance of
witnesses
Depositions of witnesses
Interrogatories to adverse
party
Production of books, accounts, and other writings

Discovery and depositions*
Subpoena of witnesses*
Depositions and perpetuation
of testimony
Summons for witness
Production of writings by
parties
Production of writings by
nonparties

325. 01 to § 325. 03
326. 05 to §326.11
§ 327.22

Subpoena of witnesses
DePositions
Demand to admit documents,
facts, records, etc.

WRCP Rules 26-37
WRCP Rule 45

Discovery and depositions
Subpoena of witnesses*

§

§

Wyoming

Compelling adverse party
to testify
Subpoena duces tecum; pr0duction of books and
papers

*Provisions are identical with those of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
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3. Powers of the Attorneys General
In addition to the ordinary procedural rules respecting discovery in all criminal and civil cases, the attorneys general in
some states have been entrusted with special investigatory powers.
In some instances the subpoena power is very broad, for example, embracing "every violation of the laws of the state." In
fact, in some jurisdictions the subpoena is administrative in
character, there being no requirement of judicial superintendence
in issuance 72 (though under the usual rule enforcement resides
in the courts). 73
In other states the subpoena power is limited to antitrust
investigations 74 or for some other purpose. 75 As the following
chart discloses, twenty-two states (listed under the "Broad" and
"Special A-T Limitation" categories) now provide their attorneys
general with compulsory process with regard to suspected violations of the antitrust laws. (Two rather extensive studies have
been conducted in relation to these powers, which, it is thought,
obviates the need of a,ny further elaboration than that provided
in the chart.) 76
SUBPOENA POWERS OF THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL

Broad

Limited to
A-T Laws

Other
Limitation

None

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Delaware

Colorado
Connecticut

72. See generally Fein & Stackable, The Supoena Power of the Attorney
General (1959).
73. An administrative agency "could not, under our system of government, and consistently with due process of law, be invested with
authority to compel obedience to its orders by a judgment of fine or
imprisonment." Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154
U.S. 447, 485, 14 S. Ct. 1125, 1136 (1894).
74. E.g., Mo. Rev. Stat., § 416. 310 (1939).
75. E.g., Md. Code Ann., art. 32A §§ 13-19 (1957 ed.) (Blue Sky Laws).
76. See Report of Council of State Governments, "Subpoena Powers of the
Attorney General" (1953); and Fein & Stackable, supra note 72.
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SUBPOENA POWERS OF THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL
(continued)

Broad

Limited to
A-T Laws

Other
Limitation

None
Florida

Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah

Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
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C. Summary
In accordance with the so-called "liberalizing tendency" of
modern legal procedure (about twenty states have adopted the
Federal Civil Rules outright), pretrial discovery (subpoenas,
depositions, interrogatories, inspections, examinations, etc.) now
performs a vital role in the administration of justice. Whether
a government body enforcing the laws or a private party asserting his rights thereunder, a litigant today possesses an impressive array of factfinding devices. Private parties, seeking injunctions, damages, or the cancellation of contract obligations
on the grounds of another's alleged antitrust infringements, would
in fact appear to require no more by way of investigative machinery than the normal adjective facilities described above.
Government prosecutions or civil actions, however, present
a different situation. Whereas private parties are likely to be
quite aware of interferences with their rights (for example, a
victim of collusive bidding) in that they feel the immediate effects of an antitrust violation, the government (unless itself a
party to such contracts, that is, in its procurement practices)77
is not thus situated.
Suppose, as is a usual case at the state level, a customer
or competitor complains to the state enforcement officers that
someone is violating the antitrust laws.78 The enforcing body
may then request the voluntary cooperation of the suspect, for
example, in conducting a search of his records. If the suspect
refuses to comply, however, the courses of action open to the
government are quite limited. Of course, the grand jury might
be utilized if a criminal violation is suspected or a civil complaint may be issued to open the doors to the discovery procedures described above.

77. Attorney General Wilson of Texas has suggested that, in the light of
investigatory and staff problems currently confronting state antitrust
enforcement officials, the states might do well to concentrate on
this area. First National Conference, supra note 27, at 2.
78. This is presently the most common means of commencement of a
state antitrust investigation. See answers to questionnaire (Appendix
E).
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But instituting an action to ascertain if a violation has in
fact occurred seems both impalpably unjust to defendants (who
might thus be harassed without end by competitors or customers)
and a travesty upon the very purpose of such discovery mechanisms. 79 For this reason, a number of states have provided
for precomplaint investigatory procedures, to determine if a
suit should be instituted, rather than to commence an action to
ascertain if a violation has actually occurred. The form of
such investigatory mechanism is that of a broad subpoena power
in the attorney general (described above) or a special provision
in the antitrust law affording visitorial processes to the enforcing officers (discussed below).

79. See generally Judicial Conference of the United States, "Report on
Procedure in Antitrust and Other Protracted Cases," 13 F. R. D. 62,
67 (1951).

IV. STATE PRECOMPLAINT INVESTIGATIVE POWERS
A. In General
Existing precomplaint subpoena powers of the state attorneys
general have already been indicated.so· In addition, however,
twenty-one states (by statute or judicial decision) have accorded
to their enforcement officials visitorial powers over records,
correspondence, papers, and other business documents. The
specifics of such powers vary widely, and for that reason the
relevant state statutes are reprinted as Appendix C. The proposed Model State Law provision is included as Appendix D.
The theory behind these laws is that corporations exist at
the sufferance of the states, which are responsible for protecting
the welfare of their inhabitants. 81 Thus, state surveillance persists beyond the mere issuance of corporate charters or licenses
to carry on a business, which may in fact be revoked for business
misdeeds or offenses against state laws-in this case, the antitrust prohibitions. 82
Some of the states import into their visitorial provisions
the unassailability of administrative investigations (described
above with regard to Federal Trade Commission investigations).83
Others provide for some degree of judicial superintendence, for
example, the requirement of a preliminary court order.
B. Specific Provisions Summarized
There follows an attempt to describe in chart form such
visitorial laws as now exist at the state level. Alabama, 84
California, 85 and Delaware 86 (starred in the chart) have accomplished the objective by court decision. The specific statutory
language contained in Appendix C should be noted, and the answers to the questionnaire in Appendix E should also be examined
in this regard.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See generally Fein & Stackable, supra note 72.
See generally 18 Am. Jur. 2d § -U:E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 44-1402 (1949).
See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
First'National Conference, supra note 27, at 27 n. 3.
See reference to State v. Brovelli, Appendix E.
No antitrust law, but subpoena power implies power to compel books
and records. In re Hawkins, 49 Del. 544, 121 A. 2d 486, aff'd, 50
Del. 61, 123 A. 2d 113 (1956).
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STATE PRECOMPLAINT INVESTIGATIVE
PRECOMPLAINT VISITORIAL POWERS BY
THE STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL

State

Subpoena of
Persons

Inspection of
Books, etc.

Preliminary Appearance BeCourt Order? fore Court, etc.,
Necessary?

Crim. cases No
only

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes
No

No
Yes

No
No

No
No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

(50-110)
(50-153)

Yes
Yes

No
Yes

Yes
Sometimes

Yes
Sometimes

Louisiana
(51-143)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Alabama*
(55-234)

Arizona
(44-1407)

Calif.*
(11180)
(11181)

Delaware*
(29-2505)

Hawaii
( §

16 of

Act)
Idaho
(48-105)

Kansas

Maine
(137-48)

Mississippi
(1104)

Missouri
(416. 310)

Montana
(94-1108)

INVESTIGATION AND DISCOVERY

34
State

Subpoena of
Persons

Inspection of
Books, etc.

Preliminary Appearance BeCourt Order? fore Court, etc.,
Necessary?

No
No

Interrog.
Yes

No
No

No
No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes
No

No
Interrog.

No
No

No
No

Nebraska
(59-804)
(59-807)

New York
(22-343)

No. Carolina
(75-9)

Oklahoma
(79-82)

So. Carolina
(66-112)

Texas
(126-7439)

Utah
(76-58-3)

Wisconsin
(216-11)

Washington
(113. 06)
(113. 22)

As is evidenced in the chart and the appendices, state practice in this regard varies. Interestingly, Washington and Hawaii
(with two of the newest antitrust statutes) have the Civil Investigative Demand Bill provisions, on the federal model, giving these
states potentially effective investigative machinery.87 The state
with the most extensive factfinding powers, however, is Texas.
In Texas the attorney general or any of his authorized representatives or assistants have the power and authority to examine, at
8 7. The statutory language is reproduced in Appendix C.
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any time it is thought necessary, all books, records, documents,
minutes, bylaws, telegrams, letters, and other memoranda of any
corporation doing business in Texas, and to copy any record which
may constitute evidence of a violation of the laws of the state. 88
Also, the attorney general may make use of the court of inquiry
procedure. Thus, at any time he has reason to believe that there
are witnesses, within the jurisdiction of any county judge or justice of the peace, who have knowledge of any infraction of the
antitrust laws of the state, the attorney general may make application to the judge for a court of inquiry. Upon application, it
is the duty of the judge to set a date for the inquiry and to issue
subpoenas for designated witnesses, who are required to testify
regarding their knowledge of antitrust violations. 89
C. The Need for Precomplaint Process
The need for some form of visitorial power in civil antitrust
investigations-whether of the more extensive types used in Texas,
Washington, or Hawaii, or of a more limited nature-cannot be
overstated. The twenty-one states now employing such procedures
appear to have recognized the insufficiency of complete reliance
upon postcomplaint investigation (that is, the normal discovery
procedures of the state civil codes) in effective antitrust enforcement.
In the absence of precomplaint process, the state is confined
to three alternative courses of action in civil antitrust investigations: (1) voluntary cooperation of suspects; (2) the filing of a
civil complaint for the purpose of utilizing the discovery laws;
and (3) the use of the grand jury. All three alternatives are
thought insufficient for identical reasons as stated by the Attorney
General's Committee in reference to the situation at the federal
level prior to the enactment of the Civil Investigative Demand
Bill:
Voluntary cooperation of parties under investigation has often been
sufficient, but compulsory processes are required in some cases. Moreover, a Government agency should not be in a position of sole dependence
upon voluntary cooperation for discharge of its responsibilities.
Filing a civil complaint enables resort to the compulsory processes
under the • • • [ procedure codes] such as interrogatories, motions to
produce documents, depositions, etc. • • • But they come into play only
after a complaint has been filed. Thus the • • • [ Government J cannot
88. Vernon's Annotated Texas Statutes, art. 1302-5. 01-1302-5. 06 (1961).
89. !2_. at art. 7439.
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utilize them to determine whether the institution of formal proceedings
is warranted. • • • IN) o plaintiff, including the Government, may
'pretend to bring charges in order to discover whether actual charges
should be brought. ' These Rules were not intended to make the courts
an investigatory adjunct to the LGovernment } • • • •
The last alternative is the grand jury. Its use where civil proceedings are contemplated from the outset cannot be justified on the purely
formal ground that the • • • r antitrust law] defines a criminal offense
appropriate for consideration by a grand jury, even though it may later
be determined that equitable relief is more appropriate. In reality,
resort to grand jury in essentially civil investigations stems from lack
of an adequate civil discovery alternative.
We believe that the use of criminal processes other than for investigation with an eye toward indictment and prosecution subverts the • • •
policy of proceeding criminally only against flagrant offenses and debases
the law by tarring respectable citizens with the brush of crime when their
deeds involve no criminality, 90

Thus, it would appear imperative that those states wishing
to pursue antitrust objectives, but currently lacking in precomplaint civil processes, move in the direction of their prompt
enactment. Indeed, the most frequent complaint of state enforcement officials about existing state antitrust laws is the lack of
such processes.91 Only when precomplaint civil processes are
available is effective antitrust enforcement possible.

90, Supra note 65, at 344-45.

91. ~swers to questionnaire, Appendix E.

V. CURRENT STATUS OF STATE ENFORCEMENT
A. Under State Laws
As indicated above,92 in some states a resurgence is currently taking place in state antitrust activity. The answers to
the questionnaire (Appendix E) indicate that some states without
antitrust laws are agitating for their enactment, and that states
with antitrust enactments are pressing for additional personnel,
money, and statutory investigatory powers, to accomplish their
objectives more adequately.
Enforcement procedures differ widely. Wisconsin, for example, exhibits dual enforcement machinery on the federal model,
with a division of the Department of Agriculture (an administrative
agency) charged with antitrust duties parallel to those conferred
on the attorney general's office.93 Most states, however, rely
opon the attorney general's office and the local district attorneys
to enforce antitrust objectives. State enforcement procedures are
charted below. 94
STATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS
State
Alabama

Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii

Separate A-T
Division

Part-time A.G.
Work on A-T

County or
Dist. Att.

No
No A-T Law
No
No
No.
No
No
No A-T Law
No
No
No Information

0
0
9
7
3

Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

No Information
No Information
0
1

No Information
No Information

Yes

Solicitors
Yes

92. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
93. See Appendix,:-"
94. The sources are the answers to the questionnaire (Appendix E) and
Robinson, supra note 36, at 1.
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STATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS
(continued)

State

Separate A-T
Division

Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No A-T Law
No Information
No
No
No
No
No
No Information
No A-T Law
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No A-T Law
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No Information
No A-T Law
No
Yes
No Information
Yes
No

Part-time A. G,
Work on A-T

County or
Dist. Att.

0

No Information
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No Information
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No Information
No
No
No Information
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No Information
Yes
No
No Information
No Information
No
No Information
No Information
No Information
No Information
No Information
Yes
No Information
No
Yes

No Information
1
0

1
0

Staff
0
0

No Information
1 (F-T)
2 (1 F-T)
8
4
0

No Information
0
0
0
0

13 (F-T)
On Assignment
1
0
0
0
0

No Information
0
9
9

No Information
No Information
0

No Information
8 (7 F-T)
No Information
2 (1 F-T)
5
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State antitrust activity, even in the states with· more vigorous
enforcement, is meager in comparison with federal antitrust activity. Nevertheless, on the basis of the questionnaire (Appendix
E) and certain other surveys,95 comparative state activity may be
assessed. Roughly, state activity at present is as follows: 96
CURRENT STATE ANTITRUST ACTMTY

Fairly Active Under
~A-T
statute

Limited Activity Under
State A-T
Statute

Active as
Private Party
in Treble Damage
Action Under
Inactive or
NoA-T Law
Federal Laws

No Information

Alabama
Arizona
Alaska
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska

95. Ibid. The Report of the New York State Bar Association, Special
Committee to study the Antitrust Laws (1957) was also consulted.
96. See Generally Second National Conference, supra note 28.
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CURRENT STATE ANTITRUST ACTIVITY
(continued)

Fairly Active Under
~A-T
Statute

Active as
Private Party
in Treble Damage
Action Under
Inactive or
NoA-T Law
Federal Laws

Limited Activity Under
State A-T
Statute

No lnformation

Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
~orth Carolina
~Orth Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolin.a
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington

Washington
West Virginia

Wisconsin
Wyoming

As is evident, a significant correlation exists between the
more or less active states and the existence of precomplaint
process. This should serve to buttress the argument made above
that effective enforcement requires these procedures. Even those
active states without such processes insist that antitrust objectives could more effectively be served by their enactment. 97

97. See Appendix E.
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B. Under Federal Laws
As the above chart indicates, a number of states-though indifferent to the adoption and/or enforcement of state antitrust
statutes-are active as parties to treble damage actions in the
federal courts for violations of the federal laws. Maine, Pennsylvania, and Washington, for example, have recovered significant
sums in such actions. 98
The investigative and discovery procedures available to the
states in such instance are those normally incident to civil cases
in the federal courts (see Appendix B). FBI reports are not
available, although, in appropriate circumstance, grand jury minutes may be.99

98. Ibid. See also Second National Conference supra note 28 at 22 et
seq., on the treble damage activity of the iic'fue states.
99, Compare United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 78
S. Ct. 983 (1958), with National Dairy Products Co. v. United States,
384 U.S. 883 (1966), remanding United States v. National Dairy, 350
F. 2d 321 (8th Cir. 1965) for further consideration in the light of
Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966),

VI. THE RIGHTS OF DEFENDANTS
A. In General
The preceding discussion has considered the rights of government and the public at large in regard to the enforcement of
antitrust laws to achieve the obje of maintaining competition.
There is another side of the coin, h... .vever, and that concerns
the rights of persons against whom such laws are to be enforced.
Specifically, in the context of the present study, the question is
raised as to the rights of defendants, or prospective defendants,
respecting discovery or investigative demands made upon their
testimony, books, records, papers, and so forth.
Requiring under penalty of law that everyone keep a diary
of his every activity and that such be open at all times to governmental purview would certainly render the task of criminal
law enforcement officers a great deal easier.100 Such, however,
is not the American way. Indeed, federal and state constitutions
prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures and self-incrimination. The right to be secure in persons, papers, and effects-in
a word, the right to be let alone-is at the very root of our individual-centered society. The privacy of the individual is not
to be violated without compelling reasons.101
Business privacy, likewise, is rooted in strong policy bases.
Judicial protection of trade secrets, customer lists, and the likel.02
represent legal acknowledgement of the fundamental worth of
business freedom of operation as the mechanism best designed
to serve the public interest. To maintain the integrity of business, no less than that of the natural citizen, some degree of
insulation from overreaching by the state enforcement mechanism
is necessary and desirable.
Rights, however, even under the First Amendment, are not
absolute. 103 Some degree of ''balancing" (between individual and
100. E.g. Orwell, 1984 (1949).
101. See the eloquent dissent of Brandeis, J., in Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-85 (1927). See also Lustig v. United
States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
102. See generally Duane Jones Co., Inc. v. Burke, 306 N. Y. 172, N.
E.2d 237 (1954).
'103. But see Black, "The Bill of Rights," 35 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 863 (1960).
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general interest) must always exist, 1 04 particularly in the area
of economics. Competition has proven its worth as a regulator
of economic growth and development. Its fruits have been salutary and in all prospects will continue to prove so. Competition,
then, must be preserved-and this, in turn, requires some degree
of abridgment of individual and business freedoms. The question
is where the balance is to be struck between governmental "oversight" or surveillance and the right of individuals and businesses
to be let alone.
B. Judicial versus Administrative Process
1. Postcomplaint
In assessing the current status of the balance with particular
reference to investigation and discovery in state antitrust enforcement, the distinction must be kept in mind between the judicial
and administrative process. Postcomplaint process, as a rule, is
judicial in character-that is, the means of discovery under the
ordinary adjective laws of the state (depositions, interrogatories,
subpoenas, etc.) are issued by, and subject to surveillance by,
the courts.105 A party plaintiff may not probe unchecked-by his
mere assertion of a right to do so-through the personal files of
a defendant in the hopes of turning up some evidence against him.
Rather, the former' s requests for discovery are contained within
judicially supervised channels of relevancy and reasonableness.
He must describe with reasonable specificity what he is interested
in obtaining, thereby according to the court the means of measuring the request made against the defendant's right of privacy .106
2. Precomplaint
Precomplaint process, on the other hand, in its essentially
investigative character, is typically administrative (at least, on
the civil side). 1 07 A government agency (or the attorney general
acting in that capacity) is charged with pursuit of the public good.
In the antitrust area, this means regulatory supervision over the
104. E.g., Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 79 S. Ct. 804 (1959).
105. See chart, "Civil Discovery Apparatus," supra.
106. See Rule 26 (b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See also
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1946),
107. See chart, "Precomplaint Visitorial Powers of the State Attorneys

General, 11 supra.
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entire economic organism. Some degree of visitorial powers is
clearly requisite, whereby the government agency may maintain
a continuing check upon the operation of those factors (for example, competition) which the legislature has determined to be
in the public interest and has charged the agency with safeguarding. Complaints of interested parties (competitors or customer)
to the alleged antitrust violations of others is clearly insufficient
as a supervisory technique. The need for precomplaint process
is manifest.
As was stated above, precomplaint process is ordinarily administrative in character with no, or very limited, judicial "oversight." Two questions are presented in this connection: (1) What
are the implications of such process to the rights of defendants?
and (2) Is the administrative, as opposed to judicial, process requisite at this stage of the proceedings?
As was indicated in the discussion of the investigative techniques of the Federal Trade Commission,108 the scope of administrative process is very broad. Likening such procedures to
grand jury investigations, the courts have in effect read the requirements of relevancy and reasonableness out of the investigative process.109
Though agencies may not enforce their own subpoenas but
must obtain court enforcing orders to secure compliance,110 the
court's jurisdiction (constitutionally, at least) is only pro forma,
that is, ministerial.111 Even the jurisdiction of the agency over
person or subject matter is no defense to a subpoena enforcement proceeding,112 The result is the absence of any significant
degree of judicial supervision over administrative investigations.
Some states, as was seen above, retain some degree of court
supervision over administrative investigations, for example, the
requirement of a preliminary court order.113 But, other states
require no judicial superintendence at all. 114 The result of this
108, See notes 51-57 supra and accompanying text.
109. See Schwartz, "Administrative Law," 33 N, Y. u. L. Rev. 154, 164
(1958), discussing c.A.B. v. Herman, 353 u.s. 322, 77 s. Ct.
804 (1957).
110, Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U. S, 447, 14
s. Ct. 1125 (1894), is the leading case for this proposition.
111, Cf. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U. S, 186, 66
S, Ct. 494 (1946),
112. Ibid.
113, See chart, "Precomplaint Visitorial Powers of the State Attorneys
General,'' p. 33 supra.
114, Ibid.
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latter practice is to allow fishing expeditions, intimidations, harassments, and violation of privacy of the worst sort. Indeed,
under such practice a business could be subpoenaed right out of
existence. How could a business long operate without its records
(accounts receivable and payable, etc.) if these were subpoenaed
for an indefinite period? 115
C. Balancing the Interests
1. In General
The point to be adduced from the above discussion is that
precomplaint investigation does not have to be entirely administrative in character. Needed information may be gathered by
procedures more in accordance with judicial due process. As
a former chairman of the Federal Trade Commission has stated:
[ N] ecessary vigorous enforcement of the antitrust and other trade regulation statutes must be accompanied by a maximum of fairness, due process and equity in the enforcement program, otherwise firm enforcement
can be a mockery.116

The various state statutes set out in Appendix C could all stand
some improvement in this regard. Though some sort of civil
precomplaint process is clearly necessary to adequate antitrust
enforcement, at least five basic requirements would appear imperative to the safeguard of the rights of defendants. These are
discussed below.
2. Essentials of Fair Precomplaint Process
(a) Reasonable Specificity of Demand
The first requirement of fairness to prospective defendants
is reasonable specificity in stating the offense under investigation
and the information and documents demanded. At the least, the
demand should state: (1) the nature of the conduct under investigation and the provision of the law applicable and (2) the class or
classes of information to be produced, with sufficient particularity
115. See generally Schwartz, supra note 109.
116. Kintner, "Section 7 Circa 1960-Recent Developments and Future
Problems as seen -by "Federal Trade Commission Lawyer, " 39
Texas L. Rev. 823, 831 (1961).

a
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to permit the materials to be fairly identified. The Washington
Act, for example, requires the demand to state the "statute and
section," the alleged violation of which is under investigation.117
A considered decision to contest the demand as unreasonable
(discussed below) could be made only upon the basis of such information. Also, standards are thereby provided by which a reviewing court may measure the demand the ascertain whether it
contains any improper or unreasonable aspects.118
The inclusion of the requirement that the "class or classes"
of information be given, represents a compromise between the
demand for specific documents {which would stifle the investigatory process) and a carte blanche to the government to examine
all the business records, whether privileged or not, relevant or
not, (which would clearly be unreasonable and unfair to defendants). Obviously, some degree of latitude in specification is
requisite. The very purpose of the proposed process statute is
to ascertain if a violation has occurred; and this, in turn, is
premised upon uncertainty as to the specific information that
might reveal such violation. On the other hand, the government
should never undertake an investigation without reasonable suspicion of a rather specific violation of the laws. This being the
case, the government should at least know the classes of documents or types of data likely to disclose such violation. Fairness dictates then that the "classes" of information sought be
disclosed.
The alternative to specificity is authorization of a kind of
"fishing expedition," 119 the evils of which Mr. Justice Holmes
condemned as "a search through all respondents' records, relevant or irrelevant, in the hope that something will turn up." 120
The danger of unrestricted investigative powers was perhaps
best summed up, however, by the Supreme Court in Oklahoma
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling:
Officious examination can be expensive, so much so that it eats up men's
substance. It can be time consuming, clogging the processes of business.
It can become persecution when carried beyond reason.121

117.
118.
119.
120,

Wash. Rev. Code § 19. 86, 110 (2) (a) (1961).
See "Comment," 37 Wash. L. Rev. 278, 289 (1962).
See generally Davis, Administrative Law 57-58 (1959),
F.T.C. v. American Tobacco Co,, 264U,S, 298,306, 44S, Ct.
336, 337 (1924).
121. Supra note 111, at 213, 66 s. Ct, 494, at 508.
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The dictate of "reason," it is submitted, is reasonable specificity in stating the offense under investigation and the information or documents demanded. The reasonableness of the demand
could then be assessed by the courts under their already established rules regarding the subpoena duces tecum.
(b) Delimitation of Scope
In accord with the only major change effected by the House
of Representatives to the Federal Investigative Demand Bill, 1 22
it is recommended that the scope of state statutes be restricted
to demands for documents possessed by persons actually suspected of antitrust violations. "Fishing expeditions" into the
records of one suspected of a violation seem bad enough; it would
be to compound the evil to make companies which are only witnesses subject to such "roving inquiries." 123
Secondly, since the very purpose of a civil demand is to fill
the void occasioned by the unavailability of grand jury proceedings in a civil investigation, and inasmuch as criminal discovery
procedures are themselves quite adequate, it is suggested that
the use of such documents be confined to civil suits only. The
safeguards of criminal discovery should not be subverted by the
utilization of less stringent civil process. In accord with this
view, a number of the state statutes specifically declare that
their precomplaint process shall not be applicable to criminal
prosecutions. 124
Thirdly, the scope of the demand should be limited to nonprivileged and otherwise "legal" evidence. Clearly, no demand
should reach any information which would be considered unreasonable or privileged under the rules established for a subpoena
duces tecum. An example would be documents protected by the
122. See 108 Cong. Rec. 3663, 3671 {daily ed. March 13, 1962). There
is a strong argument contra. Thus, companies dealing with larger
suppliers or handlers, the antitrust violations of whom actually harm
said companies, might very well like to exhibit their books or
records to disclose such violations. Fear of reprisal, however,
absent a compulsory disclosure provision (applying to third parties
as well as suspects), might in these circumstances insulate the
violator from discovery and prosecution. On balance, however,
the textural provision seems to outweigh this consideration. i.e.,
in favor of the right of privacy.
123. 108 Cong. Rec. , ibid.
124. E. g, , Wash. Rev. Code § 19. 86.110 (1) (1961).
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attorney-client privilege. On the other hand, a corporation may
not plead the privilege against self-incrimination (the Fifth Amendment, in its federal manifestation). As a creature of the state
and recipient of benefits therefrom, it is uniformly held that a
corporation may not decline to answer questions when charged
with abuse of such privileges. Further, if the books would personally incriminate the corporate officer upon whom demand is
made, he cannot refuse to produce them, even if he made the
incriminating parts of the records. 125 The exception is if such
records concern only his "private or personal affairs," in which
event the privilege would attach. The immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures (the Fourth Amendment), applicable in a general way to corporations,126 is discussed below.
(c) Criminal Immunity
If for no other reason than obtaining access to the testimony
and records of business officials (the "private or personal affairs" category, above) without transgressing the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination, it is recommended that demands to "natural persons" immunize the information from use
in criminal prosecutions against them. Civil suits against such
parties would still be possible as the privilege has no application
in that context, and vital information as to business violations
might thus be uncovered. Many of the states currently employ
such a technique.127

(d) Restrictions Upon Production and Use of Information
Production of information is the very meat of the investigative proposals herein urged. But to produce and surrender original records for removal to distant locations for long periods of
time would be palpably unfair, and, in fact, would render continued
business operation difficult, if not impossible. The obvious solution is that records be made available to governmental officials
at the situs of the corporation and at reasonable hours, for "inspection and copying or reproduction." Thus, the government
125. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 64 S. Ct. 1248 (1944; and
Essgee Co., v. United States, 262 U.S. 151, 43 s. Ct. 514 (1923).
126. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, supra note 111.
127. E.g., Wash. Rev. Code. § 19.86.110 (1) (1961). On the problem
of dual sovereignties, in this regard, see "Comment," supra note

118, at 293-94.
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obtains the information it desires and business is not hamstrung
while awaiting the return of necessary documents and files. 128
A basic requirement should be that information so obtained
be kept strictly confidential. Trade secrets, for example, should
be kept secret; and the statute should state specifically that the
documents be used only in civil antitrust litigation inaugurated
by the designated state officials. Further, the statutory mandate
should be strictly enforced, and this applies as well to other
arms of the government itself. As stated by the dissent in the
St. Regis case:"
Our Government should not, by picayunish haggling over the scope of its
promise, permit one of its arms to do that which, by any fair construction,
the Government has given its word that no arm will do. It is no less than
good morals and good law that the Government should turn square corners in
dealing with the people than that the people should turn square corners in
dealing with their Government, 129

Indeed, St. Regis represents exactly what state enforcement
should scrupulously avoid. In that case, the Supreme Court upheld the Federal Trade Commission in its attempt to secure access to Census Bureau reports, which were declared by statute
to be "confidential." According to the Court, the statute applied
only to the "originals" and not to "copies," which the Commission
might obtain without offense. Such a decision plays havoc with
individual rights. As stated by the dissent, the "Government
should turn square corners," and this means confidentialty. Otherwise, respect for government wanes, noncompliance increases,
and effective antitrust enforcement is thwarted.
(e) Judicial Superintendence: The Requirement of
Reasonableness
Finally, judicial safeguards must be built into the investigatory machinery. The dangers inherent in unbridled administrative discretion are numerous, and have been carefully delineated
by a number of thoughtful commentators, 130 As Lord Acton
said: "Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely."
Obviously, the administrative mechanism of investigation is in
128. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 109.
129. St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U. S, 208, 229, 82 s.
Ct. 289, 301 (1961) (dissent).
130. E.g., Schwartz, "A Decade of Administrative Law," 51 Mich. L.
Rev. 775, 784-89 (1953).

50

INVESTIGATION AND DISCOVERY

need of limitation, and in our system the most appropriate limiting branch of the government in this regard is the judiciary. 13l
The important consideration is that "demandees 11 132 be afforded some opportunity to contest the demand. Whether this
takes the form of a defense in a proceeding by the government
to enforce the process133 (currently, even "jurisdiction" cannot
be raised by way of defense in such proceedings) 134 or of an
independent suit by the "demandee" to quash the demand, would
seem to be unimportant-so long as some means of contest is
provided. The fact that the "demandee" may always object to
the introduction of "non-legal" evidence (for example, privileged
information) at trial-urged by some judges as all the protection
to which one under investigation is entitled- 135 is insufficient.
The vice resides in the search itself-the privacy of one, against
whom not even a civil complaint has yet been filed, has been
violated, his business perhaps seriously disrupted.
It is recognized that the right alluded to above is not absolute. But that this is true does not require that it be completely forsaken. The provision for administrative investigation as a
necessary prerequisite to effective antitrust enforcement can be
afforded, while at the same time safeguarding the individual rights
involved. The fulcrum for the "balancing of interest" here sought
consists of the provision for judicial superintendence of the investigative processes.
Establishment of a contest procedure ensures that privileged
information (described above) will remain undisclosed. But, the
scope of context should be broader than mere privilege. An
adequate standard, it is thought, is the requirement of "reasonableness," presently applicable to the federal subpoena duces
tecum. Since Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 1 36 which
indicated that the Fourth Amendment was applicable to a subpoena
ordering production of a corporation's books and records, a rather
131. See generally re the function of "limitation" in the American politico-

legal system, Burrus, Administrative Law and Local Government
(1963).
132. Those upon whom demands are made or process is served.
133. An agency or department may not enforce its own process, e.g. ,

by contempt of the agency, but must bring suit in court. Supra
note 110. State precomplaint process should make no change in
this regard.
134. Supra note 111.
135. E.g., C.A.B. v. Herman, supra note 109.
136. Supra note 111.
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definite body of law has developed concerning the requirement of
reasonableness. Included are three components:
1. The documents must be relevant to the investigation being pursued.
Relevance is satisfied by showing a relation between the documents which
must be produced and the inquiry.
2. The subpoena must specify the documents to be produced with
reasonable particularity. This requires "specification . . • adequate,
but not excessive, for the purposes of the relevant inquiry."
The
subpoena meets this test if it distinguishes between relevant and irrelevant material, though some cases add the requirement that the
supoena must specify the documents to be produced or the subjects
to which they relate with enough precision to make compliance possible.
3. The subpoena may order the production of records covering
only a reasonable period of time. The facts of each case determine
whether the time period covered by the records sought is reasonable.
It must bear some relation to the subject of the investigation.
The
following factors affect the reasonableness of the period covered:
The type and extent of the investigation; the materiality of the subject matter to the type of investigation; the particularity with which
the documents are described; the good faith of the party demanding
the broad coverage; [and] a showing of the need for such extended
coverage.137

The objection to such judicial "oversight" is that it is obstructive. Thus, the complaint is made that contest will occur
in every case-slowing down, if not halting completely, the investigative machinery. 138 Mr. Benjamin's answer, however,
seems persuasive:
Investigation is in many cases the first, and in many the only, point of
personal contact between an [ investigatory] • • • agency and the person
with whom the agency is dealing. The investigatory personnel is more
numerous than any other that comes into contact with the public. Dissatisfaction with the way in which that personnel performs its duties
could thus go far to impair public confidence in the whole [ investigatory J
• • • process.139

137. "Comment," supra note 118, at 292-93.
138. E.g., Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, supra note 111.
139. Benjamin, Administrative Adjudication in New York 73 (1942).
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As important as antitrust enforcement is, its accomplishment
must be achieved by a maximum of fairness, due process, and
equity; and this is true regardless of the fact that obstruction
may occur in a particular case. "Otherwise," to recall the
words of Mr. Kintner, "firm enforcement can be a mockery."140

140. SUpra note 116.

VII. CONCLUSION

The 1960's currently manifest prospects of becoming a decade
of the most vigorous enforcement of antitrust laws. The states,
as well as the federal government, are entering the enforcement
arena, thus filling a void which has previously existed respecting
threats to competition of local effect outside the control of the
federal statutes. Federal-state cooperation seems clearly necessary to achieve the objectives of the antitrust laws.
A vital aspect of antitrust enforcement is investigation and
discovery. Information must be gathered, first, to determine
whether to institute an antitrust action because a violation has
occurred and, secondly, to discover evidence to utilize if suit
is contemplated. The current status of state discovery, both
criminal and civil, has been analyzed in both its precomplaint
and postcomplaint aspects. The principal problem that presently
faces state enforcement programs has been ascertained to be
that of providing precomplaint civil processes-to determine whether a suit should in fact be instituted.
The civil investigative demand or visitorial statute thus envisioned, however, should recognize individual rights. The administrative subpoena, which in the hands of unscrupulous administrators can become a kind of general warrant, is not necessary. Factfinding is quite possible in the presence of general
judicial supervision. In the balancing of interests between effective government enforcement and the rights of parties defendant,
five general requirements of a fair and equitable civil process
statute have been indicated. These are:
(a) Reasonable Specificity of Demand;
(b) Delimitation of Scope of Demand;
(c) Criminal Immunity;
(d) Restrictions Upon Production and Use of Information;
(e) Judicial Superintendence.
It is to be hoped that the states will move in this direction.
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APPENDIX A
ANTITRUST CIVIL PROCESS ACT

76 Stat. 518 (1962)

AN ACT
To authorize the Attorney General to compel the production of
documentary evidence required in civil investigations for the
enforcement of the antitrust laws, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this
Act may be cited as the "Antitrust Civil Process Act".

DEFINITIONS
Sec. 2. For the purposes of this Act(a) The term "antitrust law" includes:
(1) Each provision of law defined as one of the antitrust laws by section 1 of the Act entitled "An Act to
supplement existing Jaws against unlawful restraints
and monopolies, and for other purposes," approved
October 15, 1914 (38 Stat. 730, as amended; 15 U.S.C.
12), commonly known as the Clayton Act;
(2) The Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C.
41 and the following); and
(3) Any statute hereafter enacted by the Congress
which prohibits, or makes available to the United States
in any court of the United States any civil remedy with
respect to (A) any restraint upon or monopolization or
interstate or foreign trade or commerce, or (B) any
unfair trade practice in or affecting such commerce;
(b) The term "antitrust order" means any final order,
decree, or judgment of any court of the United States, duly
entered in any case or proceeding arising under any antitrust law;
(c) The term "antitrust investigation" means any inquiry
conducted by any antitrust investigator for the purpose of
54
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ascertaining whether any person is or has been engaged in
any antitrust violation;
(d} The term "antitrust violation" means any act or omission in violation of any antitrust law or any antitrust order;
(e} The term "antitrust investigator" means any attorney
or investigator employed by the Department of Justice who
is charged with the duty of enforcing or carrying into effect
any antitrust law;
(f} The term "person" means any corporation, association,
partnership, or other legal entity not a natural person;
(g) The term "documentary material" includes the original
or any copy of any book, record, report, memorandum, paper,
communication, tabulation, chart, or other document; and
(h} The term "custodian" means the antitrust document
custodian or any deputy custodian designated under section
4 (a} of this Act.
CIVIL INVESTIGATIVE DEMAND
Sec. 3. (a) Whenever the Attorney General, or the Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, has reason to believe that any person under
investigation may be in possession, custody, or control of any
documentary material relevant to a civil antitrust investigation,
he may, prior to the institution of a civil or criminal proceeding
thereon, issue in writing, and cause to be served upon such person, a civil investigative demand requiring such person to produce
such material for examination.
(b) Each such demand shall(1) state the nature of the conduct constituting the
alleged antitrust violation which is under investigation
and the provision of law applicable thereto;
(2) describe the class or classes of documentary
material to be produced thereunder with such definiteness and certainty as to permit such material to be
fairly identified;
(3) prescribe a return date which will provide a reasonable period of time within which the material so
demanded may be assembled and made available for
inspection and copying or reproduction; and
(4) identify the custodian to whom such material
shall be made available.
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(c) No such demand shall(1) contain any requirement which would be held to
be unreasonable if contained in a subpoena duces tecum
issued by a court of the United States in aid of a grand
jury investigation of such alleged antitrust violation; or
(2) require the production of any documentary evidence which would be privileged from disclosure if
demanded by a subpoena duces tecum issued by a
court of the United States in aid of a grand jury investigation of such alleged antitrust violation.
(d} Any such demand may be served by any antitrust investigator, or by any United States marshal or deputy
marshal, at any place within the territorial jurisdiction of
any court of the United States.
(e) Service of any such demand or of any petition filed
under section 5 of this Act may be made upon a partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity by(1) delivering a duly executed copy thereof to any
partner, executive officer, managing agent, or general
agent thereof, or to any agent thereof authorized by
appointment or by law to receive service of process
on behalf of such partnership, corporation, association,
or entity;
(2) delivering a duly executed copy thereof to the
principal office or place of business of the partnership,
corporation, association, or entity to be served; or
(3) depositing such copy in the United States mails,
by registered or certified mail duly addressed to such
partnership, corporation, association, or entity at its
principal office or place of business.
(f) A verified return by the individual serving any such
demand or petition setting forth the manner of such service
shall be proof of such service. In the case of service by
registered or certified mail, such return shall be accompanied by the return post office receipt of delivery of such
demand.
ANTITRUST DOCUMENT CUSTODIAN
Sec.
Antitrust
antitrust
and such

4. (a) The Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Division of the Department of Justice shall designate an
investigator to serve as antitrust document custodian,
additional antitrust investigators as he shall determine

APPENDIX A

57

from time to time to be necessary to serve as deputies to such
officer.
(b) Any person upon whom any demand issued under section
3 has been duly served shall make such material available for
inspection and copying or reproduction to the custodian designated
therein at the principal place of business of such person (or at
such other place as such custodian and such person thereafter may
agree and prescribe in writing or as the court may d~rect, pursuant to section 5(d) of this Act) on the return date specified in
such demand (or on such later date as such custodian may prescribe in writing). Such person may upon written agreement between such person and the custodian substitute for copies of all
or part of such material originals thereof.
(c) The custodian to whom any documentary material is so
delivered shall take physical possession thereof, and shall be responsible for the use made thereof and for the return thereof
pursuant to this Act. The custodian may cause the preparation
of such copies of such documentary material as may be required
for official use under regulations which shall be promulgated by
the Attorney General. While in the possession of the custodian,
no material so produced shall be available for examination, without the consent of the person who produced such material, by any
individual other than a duly authorized officer, member, or employee of the Department of Justice. Under such reasonable terms
and conditions as the Attorney General shall prescribe, documentary material while in the possession of the custodian shall be
available for examination by the person who produced such material or any duly authorized representative of such person.
(d) Whenever any attorney has been designated to appear on
behalf of the United States before any court or grand jury in any
case or proceeding involving any alleged antitrust violation, the
custodian may deliver to such attorney such documentary material
in the possession of the custodian as such attorney determines to
be required for use in the presentation of such case or proceeding
on behalf of the United States. Upon the conclusion of any such
case or proceeding, such attorney shall return to the custodian
any documentary material so withdrawn which has not passed into
the control of such court or grand jury through the introduction
thereof into the record of such case or proceeding.
(e) Upon the completion of (1) the antitrust investigation for
which any documentary material was produced under this Act, and
(2) any case or proceeding arising from such investigation, the
custodian shall return to the person who produced such material
all such material (other than copies thereof made by the Department
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of Justice pursuant to subsection (c) ) which has not passed into
the control of any court or grand jury through the introduction
thereof into the record of such case or proceeding.
(f) When any documentary material has been produced by any
person under this Act for use in any antitrust investigation, and
no such case or proceeding arising therefrom has been instituted
within a reasonable time after completion of the examination and
analysis of all evidence assembled in the course of such investigation, such person shall be entitled, upon written demand made
upon the Attorney General or upon the Assistant Attorney General
in charge of the Antitrust Division, to the return of all documentary material (other than copies thereof made by the Department
of Justice pursuant to subsection (c) ) so produced by such person.
(g) In the event of the death, disability, or separation from
service in the Department of Justice of the custodian of any documentary material produced under any demand issued under this
Act, or the official relief of such custodian from responsibility
for the custody and control of such material, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division shall promptly (1)
designate another antitrust investigator to serve as custodian there·
of, and (2) transmit notice in writing to the person who produced
such material as to the identity and address of the successor so
designated. Any successor so designated shall have with regard
to such materials all duties and responsibilities imposed by this
Act upon his predecessor in office with regard thereto, except
that he shall not be held responsible for any default or dereliction
which occurred before his designation as custodian.
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

Sec. 5. (a) Whenever any person fails to comply with any
civil investigative demand duly served upon him under section 3
or whenever satisfactory copying or reproduction of any such material cannot be done and such person refuses to surrender such
material, the Attorney General, through such officers or attorneys
as he may designate, may file, in the district court of the United
States for any judicial district in which such person resides, is
found, or transacts business, and serve upon such person a petition for an order of such court for the enforcement of this Act,
except that if such person transacts business in more than one
such district such petition shall be filed in the district in which
such person maintains his principal place of business; or in such
other district in which such person transacts business as may be
agreed upon by the parties to such petition.
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(b) Within twenty days after the service of any such demand
upon any person, or at any time before the return date specified
in the demand, whichever period is shorter, such person may file,
in the district court of the United States for the judicial district
within which such person resides, is found, or transacts business,
and serve upon such custodian a petition for an order of such
court modifying or setting aside such demand. The time allowed
for compliance with the demand in whole or in part as deemed
proper and ordered by the court shall not run during the pendency
of such petition in the court. Such petition shall specify each
ground upon which the petitioner relies in seeking such relief,
and may be based upon any failure of such demand to comply with
the provisions of this Act, or upon any constitutional or other
legal right or privilege of such person.
(c) At any time during which any custodian is in custody or
control of any documentary material delivered by any person in
compliance with any such demand, such person may file, in the
district court of the United States for the judicial district within
which the office of such custodian is situated, and serve upon such
custodian a petition for an order of such court requiring the performance by such custodian of any duty imposed upon him by this
Act.
(d) Whenever any petition is filed in any district court of the
United States under this section, such court shall have jurisdiction
to hear and determine the matter so presented, and to enter such
order or orders as may be required to carry into effect the provisions of this Act. Any final order so entered shall be subject
to appeal pursuant to section 1291 of title 28 of the United States
Code. Any disobedience of any final order entered under this
section by any court shall be punished as a contempt thereof.
(e) To the extent that such rules may have application and are
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure shall apply to any petition under this Act.

CRIMINAL PENALTY
Sec. 6. (a) Section 1505, title 18, United States Code, is
amended to read as follows:
"§

1505.

Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies,
and committees

"Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or
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impede any witness in any proceeding pending before any department or agency of the United States, or in connection with any
inquiry or investigation being had by either House, or any committee of either House, or any joint committee of the Congress;
or
''Whoever injures any party or witness in his person or property on account of his attending or having attended such proceeding, inquiry, or investigation, or on account of his testifying or
having testified to any matter pending therein; or
"Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or obstruct
compliance in whole or in part with any civil investigative demand
duly and properly made under the Antitrust Civil Process Act
willfully removes from any place, conceals, destroys, mutilates,
alters, or by other means falsifies any documentary material
which is the subject of such demand; or
"Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes
or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper
administration of the law under which such proceeding is being
had before such department or agency of the United States, or the
due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which such
inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress"Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both."
(b) The analysis of chapter 73 of title 18 of United States Code
is amended so that the title of section 1505 shall read therein as
follows:
"1505.

Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies,
and committees."
SAVING PROVISION

Sec. 7. Nothing contained in this Act shall impair the authority of the Attorney General, the Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, or
any antitrust investigator to (a) lay before any grand jury impaneled before any district court of the United States any evidence concerning any alleged antitrust violation, {b) invoke the power of any
such court to compel the production of any evidence before any
such grand jury, or (c) institute any proceeding for the enforcement of any order or process issued in execution of such power,
or to punish disobedience of any such order or process by any person,
including a natural person.
Approved September 19, 1962.

APPENDIXB
DISCOVERY UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Rule 26.
DEPOSITIONS PENDING ACTION
(a) When Depositions May Be Taken. Any party may take
the testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition upon
oral examination or written interrogatories for the purpose of
discovery or for use as evidence in the action or for both purposes.
After commencement of the action the deposition may be taken
without leave of court, except that leave, granted with or without
notice, must be obtained if notice of the taking is served by the
plaintiff within 20 days after commencement of the action. The
attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of subpoena
as provided in Rule 45. Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these rules. The deposition of a person confined
in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as
the court prescribes. As amended Dec. 27, 1946, eff. March 19,
1948.
(b) Scope of Examination. Unless otherwise order by the
court as provided by Rule 30(b) or (d), the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to
the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the examining party or to the
claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books,
documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location
of persons having knowledge of relevant facts. It is not ground
for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial
if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence. As amended Dec. 27, 1946,
eff. March 19, 1948.
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Rule 31.
DEPOSITIONS OF WITNESSES UPON WRITTEN
INTERROGATORIES

(a) Serving Interrogatories; Notice. A party desiring to take
the deposition of any person upon written interrogatories shall
serve them upon every other party with a notice stating the name
and address of the person who is to answer them and the name
or descriptive title and address of the officer before whom the
deposition is to be taken. Within 10 days thereafter a party so
served may serve cross interrogatories upon the party proposing
to take the deposition. Within 5 days thereafter the latter may
serve redirect interrogatories upon a party who has served cross
interrogatories. Within 3 days after being served with redirect
interrogatories, a party may serve recross interrogatories upon
the party proposing to take the deposition.

Rule 33.
INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES
Any party may serve upon any adverse party written interrogatories to be answered by the party served or, if the party served
is a public or private corporation or a partnership or association,
by any officer or agent, who shall furnish such information as is
available to the party. Interrogatories may be served after commencement of the action and without leave of court, except that,
if service is made by the plaintiff within 10 days after such commencement, leave of court granted with or without notice must
first be obtained. The interrogatories shall be answered separately and fully in writing under oath. The answers shall be signed
by the person making them; and the party upon whom the interrogatories have been served shall serve a copy of the answers on the
party submitting the interrogatories within 15 days after the service of the interrogatories, unless the court, on motion and notice
and for good cause shown, enlarges or shortens the time. Within
10 days after service of interrogatories a party may serve written
objections thereto together with a notice of hearing the objections
at the earliest practicable time. Answers to interrogatories to
which objection is made shall be deferred until the objections are
determined.
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Interrogatories may relate to any matters which can be inquired into under Rule 26(b), and the answers may be used to
the same extent as provided in Rule 26(d) for the use of the deposition of a party. Interrogatories may be served after a deposition has been taken, and a deposition may be sought after interrogatories have been answered, but the court, on motion of the
deponent or the party interrogated, may make such protective
order as justice may require. The number of interrogatories or
of sets of interrogatories to be served is not limited except as
justice requires to protect the party from annoyance, expense,
embarrassment, or oppression. The provisions of Rule 30{b) are
applicable for the protection of the party from whom answers to
interrogatories are sought under this rule. As amended Dec. 27,
1946, eff. March 19, 1948.
Rule 34.
DISCOVERY AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND
TIDNGS FOR INSPECTION, COPYING, OR PHOTOGRAPIDNG
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and
upon notice to all other parties, and subject to the provisions of
Rule 30 (b), the court in which an action is pending may .(1) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying
or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence relating to any of the matters within the
scope of the examination permitted by Rule 26(b) and which are
in his possession, custody, or control; or (2) order any party to
permit entry upon designated land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any designated object or
operation thereon within the scope of the examination permitted
by Rule 26{b). The order shall specify the time, place, and manner of making the inspection and taking the copies and photographs
and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just. As
amended Dec. 27, 1946, eff. March 19, 1948.
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Rule 35.
PHYSICAL AND MENTAL EXAMINATION OF PERSONS

(a) Order for Examination. In an action in which the mental
or physical condition of a party is in controversy, the court in
which the action is pending may order him to submit to a physical
or mental examination by a physician. The order may be made
only on motion for good cause shown and upon notice to the party
to be examined and to all other parties and shall specify the time,
place, manner, conditions, and scope of the examination and the
person or persons by whom it is to be made.

Rule 37.
REFUSAL TO MAKE DISCOVERY:

CONSEQUENCES

(a) Refusal to Answer. If a party or other deponent refuses
to answer any question propounded upon oral examination, the
examination shall be completed on other matters or adjourned,
as the proponent of the question may prefer. Thereafter, on reasonable notice to all persons affected thereby, he may apply to
the court in the district where the deposition is taken for an order
compelling an answer. Upon the refusal of a deponent to answer
any interrogatory submitted under Rule 31 or upon the refusal of
a party to answer any interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, the
proponent of the question may on like notice make like application
for such an order. If the motion is granted and if the court finds
that the refusal was without substantial justification the court shall
require the refusing party or deponent and the party or attorney
advising the refusal or either of them to pay to the examining
party the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining
the order, including reasonable attorney's fees. If the motion is
denied and if the court finds that the motion was made without
substantial justification, the court shall require the examining
party or the attorney advising the motion or both of them to pay
to the refusing party or witness the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees.
(b) Failure to Comply With Order.
{l) Contempt. If a party or other witness refuses to be sworn
or refuses to answer any question after being directed to do so by
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the court in the district in which the deposition is being taken,
the refusal may be considered a contempt of that court.
(2) Other Consequences. If any party or an officer or managing agent of a party refuses to obey an order made under subdivision (a) of this rule requiring him to answer designated questions, or an order made under Rule 34 to produce any document
or other thing for inspection, copying, or photographing or to
permit it to be done, or to permit entry upon land or other property, or an order made under Rule 35 requiring him to submit to
a physical or mental examination, the court may make such orders
in regard to the refusal as are just, and among others the following:
(i) An order that the matters regarding which the questions
were asked, or the character or description of the thing or land,
or the contents of the paper, or the physical or mental condition
of the party, or any other designated facts shall be taken to be
established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the
claim of the party obtaining the order;

Rule 45.
SUBPOENA
(a) For Attendance of Witnesses; Form; Issuance. Every
subpoena shall be issued by the clerk under the seal of the court,
shall state the name of the court and the title of the action, and
shall command each person to whom it is directed to attend and
give testimony at a time and place therein specified. The clerk
shall issue a subpoena, or a subpoena for the production of documentary evidence, signed and sealed but otherwise in blank, to a
party requesting it, who shall fill it in before service.
(b) For Production of Documentary Evidence. A subpoena
may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce
the books, papers, documents, or tangible things designated therein; but the court, upon motion made promptly and in any event at
or before the time specified in the subpoena for compliance therewith, may (1) quash or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable
and oppressive or (2) condition denial of the motion upon the advancement by the person in whose behalf the subpoena is issued
of the reasonable cost of producing the books, papers, documents,
or tangible things. As amended Dec. 27, 1946, eff. March 19, 1948.
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(c) Service. A subpoena may be served by the marshal, by
his deputy, or by any other person who is not a party and is not
less than 18 years of age. Service of a subpoena upon a person
named therein shall be made by delivering a copy thereof to such
person and by tendering to him the fees for on day's attendance
and the mileage allowed by law. When the subpoena is issued on
behalf of the United States or an officer or agency thereof, fees
and mileage need not be tendered.
(d) Subpoena for Taking Depositions; Place of Examination.
(1) Proof of service of a notice to take a deposition as provided in Rules 30(a) and 3l(a) constitutes a sufficient authorization for the issuance by the clerk of the district court for the
district in which the deposition is to be taken of subpoenas for
the persons named or described therein. The subpoena may command the person to whom it is directed to produce designated
books, papers, documents, or tangible things which constitute or
contain evidence relating to any of the matters within the scope
of the examination permitted by Rule 26(b), but in that event the
subpoena will be subject to the provisions of subdivision (b) of
Rule 30 and subdivision (b) of this Rule 45.
(2) A resident of the district in which the deposition is to be
taken may be required to attend an examination only in the county
wherein he resides or is employed or transacts his business in
person, or at such other convenient place as is fixed by an order
of court. A nonresident of the district may be required to attend
only in the county wherein he is served with a subpoena, or within
40 miles from the place of service, or at such other convenient
place as is fixed by an order of court. As amended Dec. 27,
1946, eff. March 19, 1948.

(f) Contempt. Failure by any person without adequate excuse
to obey a subpoena served upon him may be deemed a contempt
of the court from which the subpoena issued.

APPENDIX C
STATE ANTITRUST INVESTIGATION STATUTES
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §44-1407 (1956)
A. The superior court shall, upon good cause shown and upon
written application of the county attorney or attorney general,
cause issuance and service of subpoenas upon witnesses named
in the application, for the appearance in court of such witnesses.
The witnesses shall testify to any knowledge they have of a violation of this article.
B. Any person subpoenaed and examined as provided by this
section shall not be liable to criminal prosecution for the violation of this article about which he testifies, * * *
Hawaii Rev. Laws § 205A-l-16 (Supp. 1961)
(1) Whenever it appears to the attorney general, either upon
complaint or otherwise, that any person or persons, has engaged
in or engages in or is about to engage in any act or practice by
this Act prohibited or declared to be illegal, or that any person
or persons, has assisted or participated in any plan, scheme,
agreement or combination of the nature described herein, or
whenever he believes it to be in the public interest that an investigation be made, he may in his discretion either require or
permit such complainant to file with him a statement in writing
under oath or otherwise as to all the facts and circumstances
concerning the subject matter which he believes to be in the public
interest to investigate. The attorney general may also require
such other data and information from such complainant as he may
deem relevant and may make such special and independent investigations as he may deem necessary in connection with the matter.
(2) Whenever the attorney general has reason to believe that
any person may be in possession, custody, or control of any documentary material, objects, tangible things or information (hereinafter referred to as "documentary evidence") pertinent to any investigation of a possible violation of this Act and before the filing
of any complaint in court, he may issue in writing, and cause to
be served upon such person, an investigative demand requiring
such person to produce such documentary evidence for examination.
67
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(3) Each such demand shall:
(a) state that an alleged violation of the section or sections of
this Act which are under investigation;
{b) describe and fairly indentify the documentary evidence to
be produced, or to be answered;
(c) prescribe a return date within a reasonable period of time
during which the documentary evidence demanded may be assembled
and produced;
(d) identify the custodian to whom such documentary evidence
are to be delivered; and
(e) specify a place at which such delivery is to be made.
(4) No such demand shall:
(a) contain any requirement which would be held to be unreasonable if contained in a subpoena duces tecum issued by a court
of this State in aid of a grand jury investigation of such possible
violation; or
(b) require the production of any documentary evidence which
would be privileged from disclosure if demanded by a subpoena
duces tecum issued by a court of this State in aid of a grand jury
investigation of such possible violation.
(5) Any such demand may be served by an attorney employed
by or other authorized employee of this State at any place within
the territorial jurisdiction of any court of this State.
(6) Service of any such demand or of any petition filed under
subsection 15 of this section, may be made upon a partnership,
trust, corporation, association, or other legal entity by:
(a) delivering a duly executed copy thereof to any partner,
trustee, executive officer, managing agent, or general agent thereof, or to any agent, thereof authorized by appointment or by law
to receive service or [ of] process on behalf of such partnership,
trust, corporation, association, or entity; or
(b) delivering a duly executed copy thereof to the principal
office or place of business in this State of the partnership, trust,
corporation, association, or entity to be served; or
(c) depositing such copy in the United States mails, by registered or certified mail duly addressed to such partnership, trust,
corporation, association or entity at its principal office or place
of business in this State.
(7) A verified return by the individual serving any such demand
or petition setting forth the manner of such service shall be proof
of such service. In the case of service by registered or certified
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mail, such return shall be accompanied by the return post office
· receipt of delivery of such demand or petition.
(8) The attorney general shall designate a representative to
serve as custodian of any documentary evidence, and such additional representatives as he shall determine from time to time
to be necessary to serve as deputies to such officer.
(9) Any person upon whom any demand issued under subsection (2) has been duly served shall deliver such documentary evidence to the custodian designated therein as the place specified
therein (or at such other place as such custodian thereafter may
prescribe in writing) on the return date specified in such demand
(or on such other date as such custodian may prescribe in writing). No such demand or custodian may require delivery of any
documentary evidence to be made:
(a) at any place outside the territorial jurisdiction of this
State without the consent of the person upon whom such demand
was served; or
(b) at any place other than the place at which such documentary evidence is situated at the time of service of such demand
until the custodian has tendered to such person a sum sufficient
to defray the cost of transporting such material to the place prescribed for delivery or the transportation thereof to such place at
government expense.
(10) The custodian to whom any documentary evidence is so
delivered shall take physical possession thereof, and shall be responsible for the use made thereof and for the return thereof pursuant to this section. The custodian shall issue a receipt for such
evidence received. The custodian may cause the preparation of
such copies of such documentary evidence as may be required for
official use by any individual who is entitled, under regulations
which shall be promulgated by the attorney general, to have access to such evidence for examination. While in the possession
of the custodian, no such evidence so produced shall be available
for examination, without the consent of the person who produced
such evidence, by any individual other than a duly authorized representative of the office of the attorney general. Under such reasonable terms and conditions as the attorney general shall prescribe, documentary evidence while in the possession of the custodian shall be available for examination by the person who produced
such evidence or any duly authorized representative of such person.
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(11) Whenever any attorney has been designated to appear on
behalf of this State before any court or grand jury in any case or
proceeding involving any alleged violation of this Act, the custodian
may deliver to such attorney such documentary evidence in the
possession of the custodian as such attorney determines to be required for use in the presentation of such case or proceeding on
behalf of this State. Upon the conclusion of any such case or proceeding, such attorney shall return to the custodian any documentary evidence so withdrawn which has not passed into the control
of such court or grand jury through the introduction thereof into
the record of such case or proceeding.
(12) Upon the completion of the investigation for which any
documentary evidence was produced under this section, and any
case or proceeding arising from such investigation, the custodian
shall return to the person who produced such evidence all such
evidence (other than copies thereof made by the attorney general
or his representative pursuant to subsection (10} of this section)
which has not passed into the control of any court or grand jury
through the introduction thereof into the record of such case or
proceeding.

(13) When any documentary evidence has been produced by any
person under this section for use in any investigation, and no such
case or proceeding arising therefrom has been instituted within a
reasonable time after completion of the examination and analysis
of all evidence assembled in the court of such investigation, such
person shall be entitled, upon written demand made upon the attorney general to the return of all documentary evidence (other
than copies thereof made by the attorney general or his representative pursuant to subsection (10) of this section) so produced by
such person.
(14) In the event of the death, disability, or separation from
service in the office of the attorney general of the custodian of
any documentary evidence produced under any demand issued under
this section, or the official relief of such custodian from responsibility for the custody and control of such evidence, the attorney
general shall promptly designate another representative to serve
as custodian thereof, and transmit notice in writing to the person
who produced such evidence as to the identity and address of the
successor so designated. Any successor so designated shall have
with regard to such evidence all duties and responsibilities imposed
by this section upon his predecessor in office with regard thereto,
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except that he shall not be held responsible for any default or
dereliction which occurred before his designation as custodian.
(15) Whenever any person fails to comply with any investigative demand duly served upon him under subsection (6) of this
section, the attorney general, through such officers or attorneys
as he may designate, may file, in the district court of any county
in which such person resides, is found, or transacts business, and
serve upon such person a petition for an order of such court for
the enforcement of such demand, except that if such person transacts business in more than one such county such petition shall be
filed in the county in which such person maintains his principal
place of business, or in such other county in which such person
transacts business as may be agreed upon by the parties to such
petition. Such person shall be entitled to be heard in opposition
to the granting of any such petition.
(16) Within twenty days after the service of any such demand
upon any person, or at any time before the return date specified
in the demand, whichever period is shorter, such person may file,
in the district court of the county within which the office of the
custodian designated therein is situated, and serve upon such custodian a petition for an order of such court modifying or setting
aside such demand. Such petition shall specify each ground upon
which the petitioner relies in seeking such relief, and may be
based upon any failure of such demand to comply with the provisions of this section, or upon any constitutional right or privilege
of such person.
If the court does not set aside such demand, such person
shall be assessed court cost and reasonable attorneys' fees and
such other penalties not greater than those specified under Section
14 of this Act. If the Court sets aside such demand, such person
shall be given the total cost of such petition.
{17) At any time during which any custodian is in custody or
control of any documentary evidence delivered by any person in
compliance with any such demand, such person may file, in the
district court of the county within which the office of such custodian is situated, and serve upon such custodian a petition for an
order of such court requiring the performance of such custodian
of any duty imposed upon him by this section.
{18) Whenever the attorney general has reason to believe that
any person has information pertinent to any investigation of a
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possible violation of this Act and before the filing of any complaint
in court, he may seek a subpoena from the clerk of the district
court in the county where such person resides, is found or transacts business, requiring his presence to appear before a district
magistrate licensed to practice law in the Supreme Court of this
State to give oral testimony under oath on a specified date, time
and place. The clerk of the district court may also issue a subpoena duces tecum under like conditions at the request of the attorney general. Any witness subpoenaed shall be entitled to be
represented by counsel and any subpoena shall state the alleged
violation of the section or sections of this Act. The scope and
manner of examination shall be in accordance with the rules governing depositions as provided in the Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure. The person subpoenaed may at any time before the date
specified for the taking of the oral testimony, move to quash any
subpoena before said district magistrate from whose court any
subpoena was issued for such grounds as may be provided for
quashing a subpoena in accordance with the rules governing depositions as set forth in the Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure.
(19) No person shall be excused from attending an inquiry pursuant to the mandates of a subpoena, or from producing any documentary evidence, or from being examined or required to answer
questions on the ground of failure to tender or pay a witness fee
or mileage unless demand therefor is made at the time testimony
is about to be taken and as a condition precedent to offering such
production or testimony and unless payment thereof be not thereupon made. The provisions for payment of witness fee and mileage
do not apply to any officer, director or person in the employ of
any person or persons whose conduct or practices are being investigated. No person who is subpoenaed to attend such inquiry,
while in attendance upon such inquiry, shall, without reasonable
cause, refuse to be sworn or to answer any question or to produce any book, paper, document, or other record when ordered to
do so by the officer conducting such inquiry, or fail to perform
any act hereunder required to be performed.
(20) Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or obstruct
compliance in whole or in part, by any person with any investigative demand made under this section, willfully removes from any
place, conceals, withholds, destroys, mutilates, alters, or by any
other means falsifies any documentary evidence in the possession,
custody or control of any person which is the subject of any such
demand duly served upon any person shall be fined not more than
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$5,000.00 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. Any
person willfully failing to comply with a subpoena issued pursuant
to subsection (18) of this section shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.
(21) Nothing contained in this section shall impair the authority
of the attorney general or his representatives to lay before any
grand jury impaneled before any circuit court of this State any
evidence concerning any alleged violation of this Act, invoke the
power of any such court to compel the production of any evidence
before any such grand jury, or institute any proceeding for the
enforcement of any order or process issued in execution of such
power, or to punish disobedience of any such order or process
by any person.
(22) As used in this section the term "documentary material"
includes the original or any copy of any book, record, report,
memorandum, paper, communication, tabulation, chart, or other
document.
(23) It shall be the duty of all public officers, their deputies,
assistants, clerks, subordinates and employees to render and furnish to the attorney general, his deputy or other designated representatives when so requested, all information and assistance in
their possession or within their power.
(24) Any officer participating in such inquiry and any person
examined as a witness upon such inquiry who shall willfully disclose to any person other than the attorney general the name of
any witness examined or any other information obtained upon such
inquiry, except as so directed by the attorney general shall be
punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment for
not more than one year, or both.
(25) The enumeration and specification of various processes
do not preclude or limit the use of processes under the Hawaii
Rules of Civil Procedure but are deemed to be supplementary to
said rules or the use of any other lawful investigative methods
which are available.
Idaho Code Ann.

§

48-105 (1947)

All the books of record and papers of every corporation, joint
stock company, or other association, engaged in business within
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this state shall be subject to inspection by the attorney general
of this state, or by any agent he may designate for that purpose,
and such corporation, joint stock company, or other association
shall, at such times as he shall prescribe, make such returns
duly verified by an officer of such corporation, joint stock company or association, as shall be by him prescribed either by
general regulations or by special direction [1911, ch. 215, § 5, p.
688].
Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann.

§

50-153 (1949)

Whenever the attorney general or assistant attorney general
shall have knowledge of any violation of any of the provisions of
any of the laws of the state of Kansas relating to trusts, monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade, unlawful discrimination,
unfair trade or the unlawful buying, selling and dealing in commodities without the intention of delivering the same, * * *

*** Such subpoenas may direct witnesses to bring with them any
papers, documents and books that may be considered material, and
may be served by any person and shall be served and returned to
said attorney general, assistant attorney general or justice of the
peace or judge, as the case may be, * * * (L. 1919, ch. 316, § 1).
La. Rev. Stat.

§

51.143 (1950)

The Attorney General or district attorney acting under him,
or the governor, before beginning an action under this Part may
present to the court a written application for an order directing
any person, as the Attorney General or district attorney requires,
to appear before any judge, clerk of court, or notary public designated in the order, and answer relevant and material questions
put to him concerning any illegal contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce, or to create a monopoly under this Part, * * *
La. Rev. Stat

§

51.144 (1950)

144. Discovery; order; production of books, papers, etc.
The order for examination shall be signed by the judge making
it, and the service of a copy with an endorsement signed by the
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Attorney General or district attorney that the person named shall
appear and be examined***

The endorsement may require the person to produce on examination all books, papers and documents in his possession or
under his control, relating to the subject of such examination * * *
(Source: Acts 1915, Ex. Sess., No. 12 § 2.)
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 137, §48 (1954)
The attorney general upon his own initiative * * * shall investigate * * * all contracts, combinations of conspiracies in restraint
of trade or commerce, and all monopolies, and may require * * *
the production of books and papers before him relating to any such
matter under investigation * * *.
Miss. Code Ann.

§

1104 (1956)

Sec. 1104. The state or any person, natural or artificial, in
the manner and in such instances as now provided by law shall
always have the right to investigate the books, records and accounts of all corporations created by it and of all corporations
doing business in this state, but this right shall not be exercised
further than to examine books, records and accounts made and
kept within three years next preceding the beginning of the examination thereof, unless an examination of books, records and accounts made before that time be necessary to an understanding
of the books, records and accounts made within said three years.

Mo. Ann. Stat.

§

416.310 (1949)

Whenever the attorney general deems it necessary or proper
before beginning any action or proceeding against any pool, trust,
conspiracy or combination made, arranged, agreed upon or entered
into whereby a monopoly in the manufacture, production or sale in
this state of any article or commodity is or may be sought to be
created, established or maintained, or whereby competition in this
state in the supply or price of any article of commodity is or may
be restrained or prevented, then in such case the attorney general
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may present to any justice of the supreme court an application in
writing, for an order directing such persons, as the attorney general
may require, to appear before a justice of the supreme court * * *
* * * Such endorsement may contain a clause requ1rmg such
person to produce on such examination all books, papers and documents in his possesion or under his control relating to the subject
of such examination; * * *
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann.

§

94-1108 (1947)

If complaint shall be made to the attorney general that any
corporation is guilty of unfair discrimination, as defined by this
act, he shall forthwith investigate such complaint, and for that
purpose he shall subpoena witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, and require the production of books or other documents,***

Neb. Rev. Stat.

§

59-804 (1960)

The Attorney General of this state * * * may especially require any such corporation, joint stock company or other association, to give a list of all contracts or transactions entered into
within the twelve months preceding such requisition, * * *
Neb. Rev. Stat.

§

59-807 (1960):

All the books of record and papers of every such corporation,
joint stock company or other association engaged in business within this stat.e, shall be subject to inspection by the Attorney General
of this state, or by any agent he may designate for that purpose,***
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law

§

343

Whenever it shall appear to the attorney general, either upon
complaint or otherwise, that any person or persons, partnership,
corporation, company, trust or association shall have engaged in
or engages in or is about to engage in any act or practice by this
article prohibited or declared to be illegal,
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The attorney general, his deputy, assistant, or other officer
designated by him, is empowered to subpoena witnesses, compel
their attendance, examine them under oath before himself or a
magistrate, a court of record or a judge or justice thereof, and
require the production of any books, or papers which he deems
relevant or material to the inquiry. * * *
N.C. Gen. Stat.

§

75-9 (1960)

The Attorney General of the State of North Carolina shall
have power, and it shall be his duty, to investigate, from time to
time, the affairs of all corporations doing business in this State,
which are or may be embraced within the meaning of the statutes
of this State defining and denouncing trusts and combinations
against trade and commerce, * * *
N.C. Gen. Stat.

§

75-10 (1960)

In performing the duty required in § 75-9, the Attorney General shall have power, at any and all times, to require the officers,
agents or employees of any such corporation, and all other persons having knowledge with respect to the matters and affairs of
such corporations, to submit themselves to examination by him,
and produce for his inspection any of the books and papers of any
such corporations, or which are in any way connected with the
business thereof; * * *
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 79,

§

82 (1951)

If complaint shall be made to the Attorney General that any
corporation is guilty of unfair discrimination, as defined by this
act (Sections 81-87 of this title), he shall investigate such complaint and for that purpose he may subpoena witnesses, administer
oaths, take testimony, and require the production of books or other
documents, * * *

S.C. Code

§

66-112 (1952)

Whenever the Attorney General has determined to commence
an action or proceeding under any law relating to the prohibition
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or prevention of trusts, combinations or monopolies or against any
corporation, foreign or domestic, for any violation of any law, he
may present to any justice of the Supreme Court or any circuit
judge, either before or after beginning such action * * * in such
order and answer such questions as may be put to them or to any
of them and produce such papers, documents and books concerning
any alleged illegal contract, arrangement, agreement, trust, monopoly or combination or corporate acts in violation of law * * *
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 7439 (1948)
Upon the application of the Attorney General, or of any of his
assistants, or of any district or county attorney, acting under the
direction of the Attorney General made to any country judge or any
justice of the peace in this State, stating that he has reason to believe * * * knows of a violation of any provision of the preceding
subdivision, it shall be the duty of such county judge or justice to
have summoned as in criminal cases and to have examined such
witness in relation to violations of any provision of said subdivision***
Utah Code Ann.

§

76-58-3 (1953)

If complaint is made to the attorney general that any corporation is guilty of unfair discrimination as defined by the preceding
section, he shall investigate such complaint, and for that purpose
he may subpoena witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, and
require the production of books or other documents, * * *

Wash. Rev. Code Ann.

§

19.86.110 (1961)

(1) Whenever the attorney general believes that any person
may be in possession, custody, or control of any original or copy
of any book, record, report, memorandum, paper, communication,
tabulation, map, chart, photograph, mechanical transcription, or
other tangible document or recording, wherever situated, which he
believes to be relevant to the subject matter of an investigation of
a possible violation of sections 3, 4, 5 or 6 of this act, he may,
prior to the institution of a civil proceeding thereon, execute in
writing and cause to be served upon such a person, a civil investigative demand requiring such person to produce such documentary
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material and permit inspection and copying: PROVIDED, That
this section shall not be applicable to criminal prosecutions.
(2) Each such demand shall:
(a) State the statute and section or sections thereof, the
alleged violation of which is under investigation, and the
general subject matter of the investigation;
(b) Describe the class or classes of documentary material
to be produced thereunder with reasonable specificity so as
fairly to indicate the material demand;
(c) Prescribe a return date within which the documentary
material is to be produced; and
(d) Identify the members of the attorney general's staff
to whom such documentary material is to be made for inspection and copying.
(3) No such demand shall:

(a) Contain any requirement which would be unreasonable
or improper if contained in a subpoena duces tecum issued
by a court of this state; or
(b) Require the disclosure of any documentary material
which would be privileged or which for any other reason
would not be required by a subpoena duces tecum issued
by a court of this state.
(4) Service of any such demand may be made by:

(a) Delivering a duly executed copy thereof to the person
to be served, or, if such person is not a natural person, to
any officer of the person to be served; or
(b) Delivering a duly executed copy thereof to the principal place of business in this state of the person to be served;
or
(c) Mailing by registered or certified mail a duly executed
copy thereof addressed to the person to be served at the
principal place of business in this state, or, if said person
has no place of business in this state, to his principal office
or place of business.
(5) Documentary material demanded pursuant to the prov1s1ons
of this section shall be produced for inspection and copying during
normal business hours at the principal office or place of business
of the person served, or at such other times and places as may
be agreed upon by the person served and the attorney general.
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(6) No documentary material produced pursuant to a demand,
or copies thereof, shall, unless otherwise ordered by a superior
court for good cause shown, be produced for inspection or copying
by, nor shall the contents thereof be disclosed to, other than an
authorized employee of the attorney general, without the consent
of the person who produced such material: PROVIDED, That,
under such reasonable terms and conditions as the attorney general shall prescribe, the copies of such documentary material
shall be available for inspection and copying by the person who
produced such material or any duly authorized representative of
such person. The attorney general or any assistant attorney
general may use such copies of documentary material as he determined necessary in the enforcement of this act, including presentation before any court: PROVIDED, That any such material
which contains trade secrets shall not be presented except with
the approval of the court in which action is pending after adequate
notice to the person furnishing such material.
(7) At any time before the return date specified in the demand,
or within twenty days after the demand has been served, whichever period is shorter, a petition to extend the return date for,
or to modify or set aside a demand issued pursuant to subsection
(1), stating good cause, may be filed in the superior court for
Thurston County, or in such other county where the parties reside. A petition, by the person on whom the demand is served,
stating good cause, to require the attorney general or any person
to perform any duty imposed by the provisions of this section,
and all other petitions in connection with a demand, may be filed
in the superior court for Thurston County, or in the county where
the parties reside.
(8) A person upon whom a demand is served pursuant to the
provisions of this section shall comply with the terms thereof
unless otherwise privided by order of court issued under subsection (7) hereof. Any person who, with intent to avoid, evade or
prevent compliance, in whole or in part, with any civil investigative demand under this section, removes from any place, conceals,
withholds, or destroys, mutilates, alters, or by any other means
falsifies any documentary material in the possession, custody, or
control of any person which is the subject of any demand duly
served upon any per son shall be guilty of an offense against the
state, and shall be subject, upon conviction, to a fine not to exceed
five thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a term of not more
than one year, or both.
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§

133.06 (1957)

(1) Whenever the attorney-general files with any circuit court
commissioner a statement that he has reason to believe and does
believe that a contract, agreement, combination, trust or conspiracy in restraint of trade as defined by section 133.01 or 133.21
exists or that a violation of either of said sections has occurred
said commissioner shall issue his subpoena for the persons requested by the attorney-general. * * *

(2) The testimony shall be taken by a stenographic reporter,***
Wis. Stat. Ann.

§

133.22 (1957)

Whenever the attorney general shall be notified or have reason
to believe that any such corporation has violated any provision of
section 133.21 it shall be his duty forthwith to address to any such
corporation or to any director or officer thereof such inquiries as
he may deem necessary for the purpose of determining whether or
not such corporation has violated any provision of said section, and
it shall be the duty of such corporation, director or officer so addressed to promptly and fully answer in writing, under oath, such
inquiries; * * *

APPENDIXD
PROPOSED MODEL ACT PROVISION*
Section 9.

Civil investigative demand.

(a) Whenever the Attorney General believes that any person
may be in possession, custody, or control of any original or copy
of any book, record, report, memorandum, paper communication,
tabulation, map, chart, photograph, mechanical transcription, or
other tangible document or recording, wherever situate, which he
believes to be relevant to the subject matter of an investigation
of a possible antitrust violation, he may, prior or subsequent to
the institution of a civil proceeding thereon, execute in writing
and cause to be served upon such person a civil investigative demand requiring such person to produce such documentary material
and permit inspection and copying.
(b) Each such demand shall-

(1) State the statute and section or sections thereof alleged
violation of which is under investigation, and the general
subject matter of the investigation;
(2) Describe the class or classes of documentary material
to be produced thereunder with reasonable specificity so as
fairly to indicate the material demanded;
(3) Prescribe a return date within which the documentary
material is to be produced; and
(4) Identify the state employees or representatives to whom
such documentary material is to be made available for inspection and copying.
(c) No such demand shall require the production of any documentary material which would be privileged from disclosure if demanded by a subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of this state
in aid of a grand jury investigation of such alleged violation.
(d) Any such demand may be served by any attorney employed
by or other authorized employee of this state. Service of any such
demand may be made by* Stern, "Text and Commentary on a Draft Statute," 39 Texas L. Rev. 723
(1961).
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(l} Delivering a duly executed copy thereof to the person
to be served, or, if such person is not a natural person, to
any officer of the person to be served; or
(2) Delivering a duly executed copy thereof to any place
of business in this state of the person to be served; or
(3) Mailing by registered or certified mail a duly executed
copy thereof addressed to the person to be served at any
place of business in this state, or, if said person has no
place of business in this state, to his principal office or
place of business.
(e} Documentary material demanded pursuant to the prov1s10ns
of this section shall be produced for inspection and copying during
normal business hours at the principal office or place of business
of the person served, or at such other times and places as may
be agreed upon by the person served and any authorized employee
or representative of the state. In lieu of having such material
copies by an employee or representative of this state, the Attorney
General may require the person served to furnish copies of the
material, the reasonable expense of which shall be borne by the
office of the Attorney General.
(f} When documentary material produced pursuant to a demand
is no longer required for use in connection with the investigation
for which it was demanded, or in any case or proceeding resulting
therefrom, or at the end of eighteen months following the date when
such material was produced, whichever is the sooner, the person
served with such demand shall be relieved of the duty to hold such
documentary material available for inspection and copying as required by sub-section (a}: Provided, however, that any court in
which a petition may be filed as set forth in sub-section (h} hereof
may, upon good cause shown, extend such period of eighteen months,
but no one of such extensions may exceed eighteen months in duration.
(g} The Attorney General or any other authorized employee of
the state may use documentary material produced pursuant to a
demand, or copies thereof, as he determines necessary in the performance of his official duties in connection with this act, including
presentation of any case or proceeding under this act before any
court or grand jury. In no other connection shall such material
or copies be produced for inspection or copying by, nor shall the
contents be produced for inspection or copying by, nor shall the
contents thereof be disclosed to, other than an authorized employee
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of the state, without the consent of the person which produced such
material, unless otherwise ordered by a Superior Court [ or insert
name of state court of general jurisdiction] for good cause shown.
Material or copies shall be available for inspection and copying by
the person who produced such material or any duly authorized representative of such person, under such reasonable terms and conditions as the Attorney General shall prescribe.
(h) At any time before the return date specified in the demand,
or within twenty days after the demand has been served, whichever
period is shorter, a petition to extend the return date for, or to
modify or set aside a demand issued pursuant to sub-section (a),
stating good cause, may be filed in the Superior Court [ or insert
name of state court of general jurisdiction] for [insert name of
county in which state capital is located] County, or in such other
county as the parties may agree. "Good cause" to modify or set
aside a demand may be shown only, except in extraordinary circumstances, by failure of the Attorney General to comply with subsections (b) or (c) hereof. A petition, stating good cause, to require the Attorney General or any person to perform any duty imposed by the provisions of this section, and all other petitions in
connection with a demand, may be filed in the Superior Court [or
insert name of state court of general jurisdiction] for [insert name
of county in which state capital is located] County, or in such other
county as the parties may agree.
(i) A person upon whom a demand is served pursuant to the
provisions of this section shall comply with the terms thereof unless otherwise provided by an order of court issued under subsection (h) hereof. Any person who, with intent to avoid, evade,
prevent, or obstruct compliance, in whole or in part, with any
civil investigative demand under this section, (1) removes from
any place, (2) conceals, (3) withholds, or (4) destroys, mutilates,
alters, or by any other means falsifies, any documentary material
in the possession, custody, or control of any person which is the
subject of any demand duly served upon any person, or who (5)
otherwise willfully disobeys any such demand, shall be guilty of
an offense against the State, and shall be subject, upon conviction
in any court of competent jurisdiction, to a fine not to exceed
$5,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years,
or both. Failure of the state to serve the demand properly pursuant to subsection (d) hereof shall be a defense to prosecution under
this subsection, but invalidity of the demand under subsections (b)
and (c) shall not be a defense, and such invalidity may be tested
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only in an action under subsection (h) to modify or set aside the
demand.
(j) Nothing contained in this section shall impair the authority
of the Attorney General or any authorized state attorney to (1) lay
before any grand jury impanelled before any Superior Court [ or
insert name of state court of general jurisdiction] of this state
any evidence concerning any alleged antitrust violation, (2) invoke
the power of any such court to compel the production of any evidence before any such grand jury, (3) file a civil complaint or
criminal information alleging an antitrust violation which is not
described in the demand, or (4) institute any proceeding for the
enforcement of any order or process issued in execution of such
power, or for the punishment of any organization or individual for
disobedience of any such order or process.

APPENDIXE
QUESTIONNAIRE:

DISCOVERY IN STATE ANTITRUST

The following questions were propounded to the attorney
general's offices of each of the fifty states:
(1) What discovery techniques are available in state antitrust and restraint of trade investigations in your state?
(2) What use is made of these techniques, i.e., how active
is your state at present in this area?
(3) What problems, if any, do you see in present discovery
procedures in this area?
(4) Are there any additional procedures you would like to
see inaugurated in your state ? Why?
The author wishes to express his sincere appreciation to the
forty-five states which replied to the questionnaire. The results
are summarized as follows:
1) Alabama: Antitrust law contained in title 57, sections 106-108,
Code of Alabama, as recompiled 1958. Broad subpoena power of
attorney general, not confined to antitrust contained in title 13,
section 229 (2)(b), and title 55, section 235.
2) Alaska: No antitrust law, but actions possible under common
law. Discovery laws closely patterned on Federal Rules. An antitrust law was introduced in last two sessions of legislature (patterned on new Washington law). Only a few complaints received
thus far. Civil remedies by private parties encouraged.
3) Arizona: Discovery procedures same as Federal Rules.
not presently active.

State

4) Arkansas: Antitrust laws contained in title 70 of Arkansas
Statutes of 1947 Annotated. Deposition and discovery statutes
contained in chapter 3 (sections 28-301 through 28-361). These
are modeled after Federal Rules. No actions in present administration, and few actions at any time. Arkansas mainly an agricultural state.
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5) California: The attorney general is authorized by Government
Code section 11180 et seq. to make investigations concerning all
matters within his jurisdiction. He is expressly empowered to
subpoena witnesses, take testimony under oath (with or without
a public hearing), and to compel the production of documents by
subpoena duces tecum. In 1961 the Supreme Court of California
had its first occasion to interpret these statutory provisions in
Brovelli v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 524. Where voluntary access to records and witnesses is denied, full reliance is placed
upon the administrative investigation powers conferred by the
above statutes. Such were utilized in all eleven of the cases filed
in the past three years and in the cases now pending. Ideally, a
broad visitorial power over corporations such as is embodied in
the Texas law is thought desirable. Such would be more expeditious in obtaining access to records and documentary evidence
than the subpoena duces tecum. The California Government Code
(11181) specifically authorizes in the inspection of records. To
date, however, a summary demand has not been devised to utilize
this power, which has no sanctions. The only recourse against
a refusal would be to the courts for a writ of mandate.
6) Colorado: The Colorado Restraint of Trade Act was not enacted
until 1957, with no actions instituted under it as yet. A remedy by
injunction is provided as well as criminal proceedings by indictment. No discovery procedures available in criminal actions. As
to a civil action for injunction, the ordinary discovery procedures
of the state (modeled after the Federal Rules) are available.
7) Connecticut: The antitrust statute is section 53-310. The statute is penal in nature, and discovery procedures are thus confined.
8) Delaware:

No answer.

9) Florida: Section 542.11, Florida Statutes, provides for the issuance of witness subpoenas directed to persons who are able to
testify as to any violations of Florida's restraint of trade laws.
Rules 1.21 through 1.34, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, dealing
with discovery in actions at law and equity, are also available.
Both the attorney general's office and the local district attorneys
make use of these procedures where necessary. A problem persists in the fact that the subpoena power provided in section 542.11,
and the limited right to take depositions prior to the commencement of an action, apply only after the action has been commenced.
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An aid to effective enforcement would appear to be that the enforcing official should have the authority to demand the production
of books and records along with the giving of testimony during the
investigatory stages of any litigation, upon his request, without the
necessity of granting immunity as is the case under section 542.11,
Florida Statutes.
10) Georgia: Both constitutional and statutory prov1s1ons exist
declaring contracts in restraint of trade to be illegal. The Georgia
Code provision, section 20- 504 (4253), declares such contracts to
be unenforceable, but no criminal provisions persist. Investigation
and discovery powers for violation of state laws are given to the
solicitors general of the several judicial circuits of the state and
to the attorney general. No monopoly laws exist in the state, although the constitution may so imply. The state's fair trade acts
have been declared unconstitutional.

11) Hawaii: The State Antitrust Law was put into effect on July
24, 1961. The application of the act has thus far been keyed to
exploratory investigative matters. No formal actions have been
filed to date (July 31, 1962). Voluntary cooperation has been forthcoming from those under investigation. The discovery procedures
available are as follows: 1) issue in writing an investigative demand for documentary materials, objects and tangible things; 2)
issue in writing an investigative demand for information (written
interrogatory); 3) subpoena a person to appear before a district
magistrate to give oral testimony under oath; 4) request a subpoena duces tecum to be issued to a person under like conditions
as stated in the case of a subpoena; 5) employ process under the
Hawaiian Rules of Civil Procedure (similar to the Federal Rules);
6) interview on voluntary compliance.
12) Idaho: Both antitrust and antiprice discrimination acts exist,
but very little activity has been forthcoming under them. The
attorney general possesses visitorial powers over company records
(Section 48-106). In relation to court actions, Idaho has adopted
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the discovery procedures
so provided thus become available.
13) Illinois: The only discovery or informative techniques available
are the ones which normally accompany a grand jury proceeding,
where the action is of a criminal nature; or the civil discovery
techniques where that is the nature of the action taken. No procedures are available prior to the commencement of an action.
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14) Indiana: No investigation and discovery procedures exist within the office of the attorney general. The discovery techniques in
Indiana are: 1) petition for and on discovery; 2) depositions, interrogatories, and affidavits to perpetuate testimony. The state is
not presently engaged or involved in any antitrust cases (August 1,
1962). Also available are inquisitorial investigations by subcommittees of the house and senate or commissioners appointed by
the governor.
15) Iowa: The state has an unfair discrimination statute. No
person may be excused from testifying because of self-incrimination (section 622.15), but he shall be given immunity re criminal
prosecutions (section 622.16). (Answer was limited by state law
prohibiting the office from giving opinions to anyone but state
officers).
16) Kansas: The state has been particularly active in the milk
pricing area. Broad subpoena powers inhere in the attorney general (both of persons and of records, section 50-153, Kansas Statutes), which he in turn may delegate to county attorneys. An immunity statute exists. (section 50-156).
17) Kentucky: No antitrust law, and the attorney general's office
has no investigatory functions to perform. The office is considering proposing a statute on the Hawaiian model. Discovery techniques are those applicable to all categories of cases as provided
in the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 26.01 - 37 .06, and
the new Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 7 .22. The office cooperates with the Consumer Protection Committee of the National
Association of Attorneys General and the United States Attorney
General in his identical bid reporting system.
18) Louisiana: The state in inactive. Though discovery procedures are available (R.S. 51:140 through 152), they have not in recent years been utilized.
19) Maine: The Federal Rules have been adopted with minor
modifications. Two special investigators are employed by the
attorney general's office, and these do work on antitrust matters.
The antitrust actions of the state, however, have been in the federal courts for violations of the Sherman Act. (On Maine procedures, see speech contained in Summary of National Conference on
Antitrust Problems and Consumer and Investor Protection 39 (1961),
prepared by the Council of State Governments.) A principal problem
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is that the private litigant is so dependent upon investigations conducted by the Department of Justice. It can't release the results
of all its investigations. For this reason, the private litigant is
dependent upon information made public through answers to depositions, etc.
20) Maryland: No antitrust law.
but no action was taken on it.
21) Massachusetts:

A bill was introduced in 1959,

No answer.

22) Michigan: In discovery in state actions, resort to federal
courts was necessary because of inadequate state investigatory
machinery. The new Code of Civil Procedure should rectify this,
but attorney general should be given the subpoena power. Also,
federal assistance is required due to inadequacies in state investigations attributable to insufficient funds, etc.
23) Minnesota: No discovery powers except as exist under the
Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, which are nearly identical to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The attorney general's
office has a trained investigator who spends about 1/3 of his time
on investigation of antitrust matters. Also, an attorney assigned
to antitrust does some investigation. A Civil Investigative Demand
Bill (such as federal model) would be desirable. The attorney
general's inability to obtain books and records, or the testimony
of reluctant witnesses, prior to the institution of suit, represents
the most formidable obstacle to antitrust enforcement.
24) Mississippi:

Not active.

25) Missouri: Section 416.310, RSMo 1959, provides that at the
instance of the attorney general and prior to his commencement
of any action to enforce the Missouri antitrust laws, an order may
be issued by a justice of the supreme court requiring named persons to appear before a justice of the supreme court or any desinated examiner and answer questions of the attorney general relating to a conspiracy, pool, trust, etc. The order may be granted
with or without notice. Production of any relevant books and records may be provided. Section 416.320. No witness may refuse
to testify or produce any documents, but he is thereafter immune
to prosecution or action for penalty or forfeiture as to those things
about which he testifies or produces books, etc. Section 416.330.
After the institution of any proceeding to enforce the antitrust laws,
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the attorney general may take depositions and the procedure is
substantially the same as in any other case. Section 416.370.
However, deposing a witness grants him immunity as above.
Section 416.400. Quo warranto proceedings against six fabricators of bridge steel were recently initiated as a result of their
conspiratorial price fixing in sales to the state. The grant of
immunity is a mixed blessing in the sense that corporations from
which one would normally want information are the ones that would
normally be the prime candidates for the role of defendant or respondent. Also, if it were later determined that one of the witnesses in the discovery proceedings was an active participant in
the trust, he would become immune at least from any state criminal action or civil proceeding for treble damages. An additional
procedure which might prove helpful would be authorization of the
attorney general to present such cases to the grand jury. The
only way he can now get to the grand jury in Missouri is upon request of a county prosecutor and order of the governor. The
broad investigative powers of the grand juries and the secrecy of
the proceedings (with the standard protections currently afforded
persons who are the subjects of such investigations) would be of
great assistance in the preparation of criminal cases.
26) Montana: Recently Montana adopted new rules of civil procedure patterned after the Federal Rules. These are almost identical to Federal Rules 33 to 37 inclusive. (Section 94-7209, Rev.
Code of 1947 provides that the rules of evidence in civil action are
also applicable to criminal actions.) No actions have yet been
commenced (i.e., since the adoption of the new rules) under the
antitrust laws. (Section 94-1104, R.C.M., 1947).
27) Nebraska:

No answer.

28) Nevada: No antitrust law.
tion in the state.

The Federal Rules are in opera-

29) New Hampshire: No activity under the statute on Combinations
and Monopolies (RSA 356). Civil discovery and deposition procedures are available, but federal action has preempted the field of
antitrust enforcement.
30) New Jersey:

No antitrust laws.

31) New Mexico: The author was referred to his own library.
(New Mexico not active).
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32) New York:

No answer.

33) North Carolina: The attorney general possesses power to
subpoena witnesses and conduct inquiries. While recognizing the
need for active state enforcement, the state awaits a complaint,
i.e., no spot surveys are conducted.
34) North Dakota: The state is primarily agricultural and thus
antitrust problems are de minimus. Nevertheless, the state is
now attempting to secure antitrust legislation.
35) Ohio: No antitrust cases for over ten years. The reasons
are budgetary restrictions and a lack of trained personnel. No
special discovery powers for the enforcement of antitrust laws
now exist. View expressed that broadest investigatory and discovery powers are necessary for effective enforcement.
36) Oklahoma: Not active. Only discovery procedures of the
attorney general's office are complaints from interested parties.
37) Oregon:
legislature.

No antitrust law.

But one has been proposed in the

38) Pennsylvania: No antitrust law. Prior to 1961, the Commonwealth had never instituted an antitrust action under either the
common law or federal statute. Now, however, the state is cooperating with the United States Attorney General's program for
reporting identical bids in state purchasing. Also, eleven actions
have been filed by the office on behalf of the state against the
electrical equipment manufacturers which have engaged in bidrigging conspiracies in connection with state purchases. The actions are under the federal laws for treble damages. Discovery
procedures are those of the pretrial conference provided under
the Federal Rules.
39) Rhode Island: Chapter 3761 of the Public Laws of 1956, and
the case of State v. Eastern Coal Co., 29 R. I. 254, are recommended as containing the current law of the state.
40) South Carolina: The attorney general has power to subpoena
witnesses when he believes the antitrust laws to have been violated.
Records may also be ordered by application to a justice of the
supreme court. Such is possible before or after filing of the
action. A criminal immunity statute is included. Sections 66-111,
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112, 113 and 115, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1952. There
are no cases interpreting the scope of the special statutory provisions.
41) South Dakota: Chapter 13.1813 of the South Dakota Code provides that in all prosecutions, hearings and proceedings under the
antitrust statutes, no person shall be excused from testifying or
producing records, etc., or from obeying a subpoena on grounds
that it may tend to incriminate him. The witness then has immunity from prosecution. There have been no prosecutions under
the state statutes in several years. A Sherman Act case is now
being pursued in the federal courts, however.
42) Tennessee:

Discovery depositions provided under Code 24-1201.

43) Texas: The Texas attorney general is granted a rather unique
investigatory power under the "visitorial statutes," articles 13025.01 to 1302-5.06, "Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Acts," Vernon's
Annotated Civil Statutes. Thereunder, the Attorney general or any
of his authorized representatives or assistants has the power and
authority to examine, at any time it is deemed necessary, all books,
records, documents, minutes, bylaws, telegrams, letters, and other
written memorandum of any corporation doing business in Texas,
and to copy and record any of the aforementioned which may constitute evidence of a violation of the laws of the state. None of
the instruments copied shall be made public and none of the information so obtained will be disclosed except in the course of a legal
proceeding to which the state is a party. The attorney general may
also make use of the court of inquiry procedure. Under article
7439, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, the attorney general may
make application to any county judge ·or justice of the peace for
a court of inquiry at any time the attorney general has reason to
believe that there are witnesses within the jurisdiction of the court
who have knowledge of violations of the antitrust laws of the state.
Upon the presentation of such application, it is the duty of the
county judge or the justice of the peace to set a date for the court
of inquiry, and to issue subpoenas for designated witnesses who
are required to testify regarding their knowledge of antitrust violations. The state of Texas is very active in the areas of antitrust investigation and enforcement. Every legitimate complaint
received by the attorney general's office is investigated, generally
through the "visitorial" procedure. Extensive courts of inquiry
have been held this year (1962) in the Billie Sol Estes case, in
the poultry industry, and in the electrical field. The Texas visitorial
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letter does not apply to individual or partnership records. This
appears to be the only significant limitation upon the Texas investigatory power.
44) Utah: The discovery techniques appear in title 13, chapter 2,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, and provide that the Trade
Commission can subpoena witnesses and documents to any of its
hearings, and that it may take depositions as provided in civil
actions generally, and that it· may appoint agents to conduct investigation, said agents to have the same power ast the Commision is
granted in the alorementioned Act, and may direct a representative
to act as a special prosecutor in any proceedings or investigations.
The use of the techniques, however, is not extensive. The state
is active in attempting to enforce provisions of the Unfair Practices Act (13-5-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended). The
Fair Trade Act was declared unconstitutional. The state antitrust
law ts criminal law and leaves it up to the district attorneys to
gain their evidence through the usual criminal procedural methods.
45) Vermont:

No antitrust law.

46) Virginia: The Virginia Antitrust Law is found in chapter 3,
title 59, Code of Virginia, as amended, sections 59-20 through
59- 40; also sections 38.1-52 and 38.1-58 through 38.1 - 62 of such
Code. No special discovery procedures obtain. State is not active.
47) Washington: Discovery techniques available include: (1) All
those in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) All those contained
in the Washington Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure (patterned alter the Federal Rules}: (a} Depositions on oral examination (Rules 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32; also see chapter 5.56 RCW compelling the attendance of witnesses}; (b) Depositions upon written
interrogatories (Rule 31); (c) Interrogatories to parties (Rule 33);
(d) Production of documents and things (Rule 34 and RCW 5.56.030;
chapter 5.46 RCW.); (e) Physical and mental examinations (Rule 35).
The state of Washington has been moderately active in antitrust
investigations. Eighteen &"1.lits have been filed in the federal courts
for violations of the federal laws (against the electrical equipment
manufacturers). Projected damages run in the vicinity of $58,000,000,
Under the state antitrust statute (chapter 216, Laws of 1961), two
suits have been filed against the Washington State Bowling Proprietors Association, and certain officers of the association. Precomplaint investigative demands have been served in ten instances:
two against a publishing company, and the remainder against certain
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jobbers and retailers of a major oil company. The civil investigative demand has proved most useful in precomplaint investigations. Since the discovery technique is relatively new in the state,
no litigation relative to the use of the demand has as yet occurred,
nor has the demand been challeged (Nov. 5, 1962). Staff and budget
limitations are indicated. On the new Civil Investigative Demand
Bill, see Howe, "Recent Antitrust Developments: Civil Investigative
Demand-Needed Weapon or Undue Power for Prosecuting Agencies," 37 Wash. L. Rev. 278 (1961).
48) West Virginia:

No Answer.

49) Wisconsin: The state is relatively active with one full-time
man, one half-time man and two investigators. In addition, a state
department of agriculture exercises jurisdiction similar to that of
the Federal Trade Commission. Of suits brought this year, four
have been completed, and eight are in progress. Seventeen others
are now pending. (April 3, 1962). Although most of the suits are
civil in nature, the attorney general has brought a number of criminal proceedings. The state has broad powers over domestic corporations and can readily obtain necessary information. There is
less power over foreign corporations, but failure to answer interrogatories may result in ouster. In cases involving price discrimination, the attorney general may issue an administrative subpoena,
which is used often, and though strongly objected to, is complied
with for fear of adverse publicity. In criminal prosecutions, Wisconsin utilizes a "John Doe" proceeding, which is similar to the
one-man grand jury. In civil investigations, the state employs an
inquisitorial proceeding, in which anything relevant, including hearsay, may be solicited.
50) Wyoming:

Not active.

